The Gay Perjury Trap by Leslie, Christopher R.
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2021 4:16 PM 
 
Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 71 OCTOBER 2021 NUMBER 1 
THE GAY PERJURY TRAP  
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE† 
ABSTRACT 
  In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court held Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex-based employment discrimination applies to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Although the opinion is an important victory, if history is any guide, 
Bostock was only one battle in a larger war against invidious 
workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Prejudiced employers and managers will seek alternative, less 
obvious ways to discriminate. Judges and civil rights lawyers must 
prepare themselves to recognize and reject pretextual rationales for 
adverse actions taken against lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees. A 
better understanding of history can inform those efforts. 
  This Article examines an unexplored chapter in the United States’ 
history of anti-gay discrimination in the workplace: punishing gay 
workers for concealing their sexual orientation. Beginning in the 1960s, 
as federal and state law implemented procedural protections for public-
sector workers, employers developed a new mechanism to evade those 
protections: the gay perjury trap. At its core, the strategy is simple. An 
employer asks job applicants about their sexual orientation. If they 
reveal that they are gay, decline to hire them. If gay workers conceal 
their sexual orientation and it is later discovered, terminate them for 
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their dishonesty. Either way, gay workers are purged from the 
workforce.   
  This Article provides historical examples of the federal government 
and local school districts using this strategy to terminate high-
performing workers who were later discovered to be gay. After 
discussing the inherent unfairness of the gay perjury trap, this Article 
explains how prejudiced employers may attempt to deploy this strategy 
as a means of circumventing Title VII liability in the post-Bostock era. 
Finally, this Article discusses how courts should prevent employers 
from using the gay perjury trap in the post-Bostock work environment. 
Dismantling the gay perjury trap entails three components. First, courts 
should interpret Title VII as prohibiting employers from inquiring 
about an applicant’s or employee’s sexual orientation. Second, courts 
should not afford employers a general right to penalize gay workers for 
concealing or misrepresenting their sexual orientation. Third, courts 
should construe Title VII to protect employees who refuse to answer 
questions about their sexual orientation.   
  Whether Title VII can effectively deter and remedy anti-gay 
discrimination will in significant part depend on courts’ ability to 
recognize and prohibit employers from using the gay perjury trap. The 
post-Bostock Title VII cannot succeed if employers can use alleged 
dishonesty about sexual orientation as a means of punishing gay 
workers and avoiding liability.   
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Thus if [a gay man] dares to show his true inclinations, there is awaiting 
the road of the outcast—discrimination, social ostracism, economic 
defeat. And if, in self-protection, he is forced to make a pretense, there 
comes denunciation for living a life that is a lie!  
—Donald Webster Cory, 19511 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After graduating from The Pennsylvania State University (“Penn 
State”) in the early 1970s, Joseph Acanfora III achieved his goal of 
becoming a science teacher.2 Pennsylvania officials had delayed a 
decision on his application for a teaching certificate. So Acanfora 
secured a job teaching science at a junior high school in Montgomery 
County, Maryland. The school district was happy with Acanfora’s 
performance. But after Acanfora was settled in his new job, 
Pennsylvania’s secretary of education took the unusual action of 
 
 1.  DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE 
APPROACH 47 (1951). 
 2.  Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 844–45 (D. Md. 1973), aff’d, 491 F.2d 498 
(4th Cir. 1974). The facts of the Acanfora case are fully discussed and cited infra notes 118–48 and 
the accompanying text. 
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holding a press conference to announce that Acanfora’s application for 
teacher certification would be approved despite his homosexuality. 
The public stunt seemed designed to sully Acanfora’s reputation, not 
to reward him with his hard-earned teaching certificate. Upon learning 
that Acanfora was gay, the Montgomery County deputy 
superintendent of schools removed him from the classroom. Acanfora 
discussed the school district’s actions against him on 60 Minutes, the 
Public Broadcasting Service (“PBS”), and other television news 
programs. In response, the school refused to renew his contract. 
When Acanfora challenged his removal from the classroom, 
courts informed school district officials that they could not punish 
Acanfora for his media appearances. The officials came up with a 
different reason to remove him from his prized teaching position: when 
Acanfora applied for his teaching job, he had not disclosed to the 
school district his prior membership in a gay student organization at 
Penn State. The officials admitted that they would not have hired 
Acanfora if he had disclosed his affiliation—and, thus, his sexual 
orientation. Instead of defending its anti-gay policy, however, the 
school district attacked Acanfora as dishonest. And the Fourth Circuit 
concurred, holding that the school district could justify taking adverse 
action against Acanfora for not listing his membership even though the 
officials did not know about Acanfora’s omission when they punished 
him.3 Acanfora became one of the early prominent victims of the “gay 
perjury trap,” a Kafkaesque device in which gay people are denied 
employment if they disclose their sexual orientation, but are 
terminated for mendacity if their employer discovers that they 
concealed their sexual orientation. This Article tells the history of the 
gay perjury trap and its relevance in the modern era. 
For most of the twentieth century, institutionalized homophobia 
made it difficult for millions of gay individuals to secure and retain 
meaningful employment across the United States. Major employers 
engaged in witch hunts designed to identify and punish lesbian, gay, 
and bisexual (“LGB”) people.4 Government employers—most notably 
 
 3.  Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 503. 
 4.  Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” 
Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 137–38 (2000) [hereinafter Leslie, Creating 
Criminals]; Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 
12 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 20 (2003); Carlos A. Ball, Obscenity, Morality, and the First Amendment: 
The First LGBT Rights Cases Before the Supreme Court, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 229, 264 
(2015). 
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the military, federal security agencies, and local police and fire 
departments—maintained official policies of terminating all known 
gay workers.5 Public schools prohibited gay people from working as 
teachers.6 Many private employers, too, had policies against hiring gay 
employees.7  
Because sexual orientation is not a visible characteristic, many gay 
people can “pass” as heterosexual. Historically, most had to do so to 
earn an income. Both government and private employers sought to 
root out gay people by asking job applicants and current employees 
about their sexual orientation. Many employers administered 
psychological tests and lie detector tests to identify gay people.8 Once 
detected, gay applicants were rejected, and gay workers were subject 
to termination, harassment, transfer, or demotion.  
By 2020, as more Americans came to understand the toll and the 
irrationality of anti-gay discrimination, almost half of the states 
included sexual orientation protections in their employment 
nondiscrimination laws. That year, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bostock v. Clayton County9 expanded such protections nationwide 
when the six-to-three majority interpreted Title VII’s federal 
prohibition on sex-based employment discrimination to bar 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.10 
 
 5.  See ROBIN A. BUHRKE, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 26, 118 (1996); Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 137–39. 
 6.  See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Loc. Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Wash. 1977); see also Christopher R. Leslie, 
The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1615 (2017) [hereinafter Leslie, 
Geography of Equal Protection] (“Local school districts routinely discriminate against teachers 
and school administrators.”). 
 7.  See David E. Morrison, You’ve Built the Bridge, Why Don’t You Cross It? A Call for 
State Labor Laws Prohibiting Private Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 245, 258–59 (1992). 
 8.  See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 9.  Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
 10.  Id. at 1741. Although Bostock applied Title VII to both sexual orientation and gender 
identity, this Article focuses on a form of discrimination that was historically targeted against gay 
workers. Sexual orientation discrimination has its own unique history and some of this Article’s 
reasoning does not map neatly onto gender identity. Employment discrimination based on gender 
identity is invidious and should be deterred and penalized in the post-Bostock era. Some (but not 
all) of the Article’s reasoning may apply to gender identity, which is discussed at infra notes 228 
to 231 and accompanying text. The issue of how employers may try to evade Title VII’s 
application to transgender workers—and how to identify and prevent such circumvention—is an 
important topic that warrants its own article. 
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Bringing gay employees within the protection of Title VII 
represents a major achievement. But, if history is any guide, Bostock 
was just one battle in a larger war against invidious workplace 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Just as 
the enactment of Title VII did not eliminate racial and gender 
discrimination, the Supreme Court’s recognition that Title VII protects 
gay workers is not a panacea. The ultimate impact of Bostock will 
largely be a function of two related reactions to the opinion: how 
prejudiced employers attempt to circumvent the decision, and how 
robustly courts interpret Title VII’s application to gay employees. 
Before Bostock, employers in half of the states could legally fire 
or refuse to hire lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (“LGBT”) 
people.11 In the absence of legal protections, many employers exercised 
their prejudice openly. The former bosses of Gerald Bostock, Donald 
Zarda, and Aimee Stephens, the named employees in the three 
separate cases that the Supreme Court consolidated in the Bostock 
opinion, certainly did so.12 These cases were by no means aberrations; 
employers have routinely fired, refused to hire, or otherwise 
discriminated against gay workers.13 
The Bostock opinion will do little to quench prejudiced 
employers’ urges to discriminate based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity. Those individuals with hiring and firing authority who 
wish to purge gay workers from their payrolls will try to circumvent 
Title VII’s application to sexual orientation via alternative, less 
obvious means of discrimination. Long before Bostock, employers 
fashioned pretextual reasons for terminating gay employees.14 The 
Bostock opinion will undoubtedly reinvigorate such gamesmanship. 
 
 11.  KERITH J. CONRON & SHOSHANA K. GOLDBERG, THE WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PEOPLE 
IN THE US NOT PROTECTED BY STATE NON-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 2–3 (2020), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-ND-Protections-Update-Apr-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZKP-A47U]. 
 12.  See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38. 
 13.  See BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, THE WILLIAMS INST., DOCUMENTED 
EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & ITS EFFECTS ON LGBT PEOPLE 1 (2011), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Effects-LGBT-Employ-Discrim-Jul-
2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/97NV-HQQK] (finding that over 37 percent of gay workers who were 
out at work suffered sexual orientation discrimination in the previous five years). One 2014 study 
found that “more qualified LGBT applicants were 23 percent less likely to be called back for 
interviews than less qualified non-LGBT applicants.” Federal Contractors Show Anti-LGBT 
Hiring Bias ,  EQUAL RTS.  CTR.,  https:/ /equalrightscenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/freedom_to_work_6_16_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7PD-WJTT]. 
 14.  See infra notes 203–06 and accompanying text. 
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Judges and civil rights lawyers must prepare to recognize and reject 
pretextual rationales for adverse actions taken against gay employees.  
History can inform those efforts to prevent and remedy more 
subtle discrimination based on sexual orientation. Ensuring that Title 
VII will protect gay workers against invidious discrimination requires 
a solid understanding of how employers exercised their anti-gay 
prejudice in the pre-Bostock era. Decades before Bostock provided 
substantive nondiscrimination protections by interpreting Title VII to 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity, federal law provided procedural and other protections to 
government employees.15 Government employers nonetheless 
circumvented these legal safeguards and continued to improperly 
terminate gay employees. In all likelihood, bigoted employers will 
attempt to similarly evade Title VII.  
This Article identifies one particularly insidious method that 
employers have historically used to discriminate against gay workers: 
the gay perjury trap.16 The gay perjury trap refers to situations in which 
employers inquire about job applicants’ sexual orientation in order to 
force gay people into a bind. Applicants who identify themselves as gay 
are denied employment, generally without explanation. Gay applicants 
may therefore seek to conceal their sexual orientation, and, if 
successful, they may be hired. Prejudiced employers may have more 
difficulty terminating a gay employee, or taking other adverse actions, 
if they do not discover that worker’s sexual orientation until after the 
worker is hired, particularly if the worker has established an exemplary 
record. A gay applicant who successfully conceals their sexual 
orientation and receives the job may, for example, be entitled to certain 
procedural protections. If, however, that employee lied during the 
application process by misrepresenting their sexual orientation, the 
misrepresentation provides the pretext for termination.  
Part I of this Article describes the gay perjury trap, examines 
historical examples, and discusses why employers have used the trap 
against gay members of the labor force. At its core, the gay perjury trap 
is simple: Ask job applicants about their sexual orientation. If they 
reveal their sexual orientation, decline to hire them. If they conceal 
 
 15.  See infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 16.  Traditionally, a perjury trap refers to the situation “when the government calls a witness 
before the grand jury for the primary purpose of obtaining testimony from him in order to 
prosecute him later for perjury.” United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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their sexual orientation and it is later discovered, terminate them for 
lying.17 Either way, gay workers are purged from the workforce. 
Part II explains how the historical cases presented in Part I remain 
relevant post-Bostock. The days of employers investigating the sexual 
orientation of applicants and employees may seem relegated to the 
past. But those days are now, and employers continue to set the trap. 
Given the intensity of anti-gay prejudice in some regions and 
employers, the Bostock opinion is unlikely to end employment 
discrimination against gay workers. As with other antidiscrimination 
regimes, employers determined to discriminate against gay workers 
will search for ways to evade the law, such as the gay perjury trap. The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the courts, 
and civil rights lawyers must prepare to recognize and respond to these 
attempts.  
Part III discusses how courts should prevent employers from using 
the gay perjury trap in the post-Bostock work environment. 
Dismantling the gay perjury trap entails three components. First, 
courts should interpret Title VII as prohibiting employers from 
inquiring about sexual orientation. Second, courts should not afford 
employers a general right to penalize gay workers for concealing or 
misrepresenting their sexual orientation. Even in an era in which Title 
VII applies to sexual orientation, millions of gay Americans will remain 
closeted in their workplaces. Third, courts should construe Title VII to 
protect employees who refuse to answer questions about their sexual 
orientation. Ultimately, courts should be suspicious of employers who 
justify adverse employment decisions on the grounds of a worker’s 
misrepresentation of—or refusal to discuss—sexual orientation. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE GAY PERJURY TRAP 
From the beginning of the modern gay rights movement, 
employers have utilized gay perjury traps to discriminate based on 
sexual orientation. The trap involves three components. First, the 
employer sets the trap by asking job applicants about their sexual 
 
 17.  Deception is not perjury unless the falsehood is told under oath. Some employment 
applications are, in fact, signed under penalty of perjury. See Hargett v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 640 
F. Supp. 2d 450, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Hargett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F. 
App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2010). Some inquiries into a current employee’s sexual orientation require the 
employee to sign official forms that state a failure to answer all questions fully and truthfully will 
result in dismissal. See, e.g., FRANK BUTTINO, A SPECIAL AGENT: GAY AND INSIDE THE FBI 95 
(1993). In others, the inquiry is less formal.  
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orientation. This can be done directly or indirectly through proxy 
questions, such as asking an applicant to identify any organizations of 
which she has been a member. The employer declines to hire any 
applicant who identifies as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Second, the 
employer springs the trap by terminating any employee who is later 
discovered to have concealed their sexual orientation during the 
application process. In doing so, the employer asserts that the 
termination is because the applicant lied, not because of their sexual 
orientation. Third, the employer prevents gay workers from evading 
the trap by refusing to hire anyone who will not answer questions about 
sexual orientation. Part I discusses each of these steps in turn. 
A. Setting the Gay Perjury Trap 
The first step of the gay perjury trap entails employers inquiring 
into all job applicants’ sexuality. In the past, those applicants who did 
not represent themselves as heterosexual did not receive job offers. 
This was official government policy during the Cold War when federal, 
state, and local governments all implemented anti-gay employment 
policies.18 Because government agencies discriminated against gay 
individuals and “[l]icensing boards restricted homosexuals from many 
occupations, and private employers banned homosexuals officially or 
unofficially[,] . . . lesbians and gay men were officially barred from at 
least 20 percent of the nation’s jobs.”19 This system prevented millions 
of gay people from practicing their professions. 
Understanding this situation, yet needing a paycheck, gay workers 
concealed their sexual orientation. Employers responded by trying to 
identify the gay people in their midst through a variety of techniques, 
including questionnaires, lie detector tests, arrest records, and 
organizational affiliations. This section reviews those methods. 
1. Direct Questioning.  Perhaps the most straightforward method 
of determining an individual’s sexual orientation is to ask them. And 
during the McCarthy era, the federal government did just that. The 
State Department’s fixation on gay men became an obsession. In his 
 
 18.  See DAVID K. JOHNSON, LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS 
AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 147–78 (2004). 
 19.  Gregory B. Lewis, Lifting the Ban on Gays in the Civil Service: Federal Policy Toward 
Gay and Lesbian Employees Since the Cold War, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 387, 389 (1997) 
[hereinafter Lewis, Lifting the Ban] (citing ALLAN BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE 
HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II 269–70 (20th ed. 1990)).  
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2021  4:16 PM 
10  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1 
study of anti-gay federal policies during this period, Professor David 
Johnson explained: “All male applicants were subject to a personal 
interview by security personnel who specialized in uncovering 
homosexuals. If suspicions were raised, the applicant would be given a 
lie detector test.”20 Those who confessed to homosexual activity were 
denied jobs.21 In 1960, the State Department rejected almost one-third 
of all job applicants due to suspected homosexuality following 
questioning and investigation.22  
Long after Senator Joseph McCarthy had been exposed as a 
dangerous fraud, federal anti-gay policies continued in full force. 
Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, all applicants for 
federal jobs were asked “Have you ever had, or have you now, 
homosexual tendencies?” as part of their medical history on the 
Standard Form 89.23 Those who answered in the affirmative were 
denied employment.24  
The government’s inquiry was often more intrusive than a single 
question about an individual’s sexual orientation. An applicant 
suspected of homosexuality could face “five pages of highly invasive 
interrogatories about his sexual life,” including explicit questions about 
oral sex, anal sex, “and how many times and with how many people he 
might have engaged in these acts and where, when, and how these acts 
might have occurred.”25 The questions appeared designed to humiliate 
suspected gay people, rather than to officially discern their sexual 
orientation.  
After they hired job applicants, federal employers continued their 
hunt for gay people who made it through the initial filters calibrated to 
create heterosexual-only workplaces. In the early 1970s, the Civil 
Service Commission (“the Commission”) spent $12 million—over $80 
million in current value—annually to investigate charges that civil 
 
 20.  JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 72–73. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. at 197. 
 23.  Id. at 196. 
 24.  Id.; cf. id. at 197 (“Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee in 1966, 
William Crockett, deputy undersecretary of state, testified that all male applicants to the de-
partment were asked directly, ‘Have you ever engaged in a homosexual act?’”). 
 25.  GENNY BEEMYN, A QUEER CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF GAY LIFE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 
189 (2015). 
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servants were gay.26 By the end of 1973, the Commission began to 
adopt modest protections for gay workers when it  
issued a bulletin to all agencies stating that [it] could not “find a 
person unsuitable for Federal employment merely because that 
person is a homosexual,” but that [it] could dismiss or refuse to hire a 
person whose “homosexual conduct affects job fitness—excluding 
from such considerations, however, unsubstantiated conclusions 
concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal service.”27  
The policy, however, was often honored in the breach.28 
Importantly, the new policy did not apply to the intelligence 
agencies.29 Consequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
continued to ask its applicants if they were gay and reject them if they 
answered affirmatively, regardless of their qualifications. Dana Tillson 
applied for a special agent position with the FBI in 1987; after her 
interview, she was informed that “she was the highest-rated female 
applicant in San Francisco and that she would be hired assuming her 
background investigation was satisfactory.”30 The FBI subsequently 
rejected Tillson’s application when she truthfully responded to the 
interviewers’ inquiries about her sexual orientation, acknowledging 
that she “engage[d] in private sexual conduct with consenting adult 
women.”31 In another example, when one Midwestern applicant with a 
graduate degree and an honorable discharge from the military 
interviewed to be a special agent, the FBI interviewer asked the 
applicant why he had left the military.32 Upon the FBI hopeful 
responding that he left because he was gay, the FBI agent replied: “The 
FBI does not hire second-class citizens.”33 The agent was too modest 
about the FBI’s influence. The FBI did not merely shun second-class 
citizens; it created them.  
By classifying Americans based on their sexual orientation and 
aggressively discriminating against gay Americans, the FBI sought to 
 
 26.  Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 392. 
 27.  Id. at 392–93. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 393; see BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 190 (noting that “the guidelines did not apply 
to the FBI, CIA, and Foreign Service, which continued to have employment policies and practices 
that discriminated against gay people until the 1990s”). 
 30.  Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 310 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citation omitted). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 289. 
 33.  Id. 
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stigmatize LGB applicants as deviant and un-American. The FBI also 
applied its anti-gay policy to its own agents after years of loyal 
employment.34 While officials sought to proffer legitimate rationales 
for their anti-gay policies, the FBI’s targeting was always driven by “an 
overarching and intense fear and loathing of gays”—or, in Professor 
Douglas Charles’s words, “an irrepressible animus.”35 
The federal government was not alone in asking job applicants 
about their sexual orientation. State governments pursued similar 
policies.36 During the height of the Cold War, for example, the state of 
Florida actively hunted for gay and lesbian teachers in an attempt to 
remove them from classrooms.37 A state committee hired a team of 
investigators to collect the sexual histories of teachers suspected of 
homosexuality.38  
Local governments, too, utilized anti-gay screens. During the 
1970s, New York’s Suffolk County required job applicants to fill out a 
questionnaire that inquired, “Homosexual Tendencies: yes or no.”39 At 
the end of the twentieth century, police departments continued to ask 
applicants about sexual orientation in order to weed out gay men and 
lesbians. In Connecticut, John Doe achieved the highest score of 
anyone taking the Hamden Police Department qualifying exam in 
 
 34.  See, e.g., id. at 94–95. 
 35.  DOUGLAS M. CHARLES, HOOVER’S WAR ON GAYS: EXPOSING THE FBI’S “SEX 
DEVIATES” PROGRAM xv (2015). 
 36.  See JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A 
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 213 (2d ed. 1998); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of 
Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2425 (1997) (“State and 
federal governments invested substantial resources in campaigns to search out and expose 
homosexuals in big cities, in the armed forces, and in state and federal employment.”).  
 37.  See JUDITH G. POUCHER, STATE OF DEFIANCE: CHALLENGING THE JOHNS 
COMMITTEE’S ASSAULT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES 86–109 (2014). 
 38.  Stacy Braukman, “Nothing Else Matters but Sex”: Cold War Narratives of Deviance and 
the Search for Lesbian Teachers in Florida, 1959-1963, 27 FEMINIST STUD. 553, 559 (2001); see also 
id. at 568 (“The interview began with the basic facts of the witness’s life—full name, age, 
educational background, and employment history. But the inquisitor wasted little time in getting 
to the point, asking some variation of ‘Have you ever been involved in any type of homosexual 
activity?’”). 
 39.  BRAD SEARS, NAN D. HUNTER & CHRISTY MALLORY, THE WILLIAMS INST., 
DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN 
STATE EMPLOYMENT 5-33 (2009) (footnote omitted), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/ENDA-5-History-Sep-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRW8-6KRZ]. 
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1994.40 Because of Doe’s exam score, physical condition, and grades in 
a graduate-level criminal justice program, the department offered 
“conditional employment” as a police officer, subject to Doe 
completing psychological, medical, and polygraph examinations, 
during which the polygraph examiner asked Doe’s sexual orientation.41 
After Doe answered truthfully, the polygraph report led with the 
statement “He is gay,” and Hamden’s police chief announced that Doe 
was not the “best candidate for the job.”42 Similarly, the Dallas Police 
Department maintained a policy of asking job applicants their sexual 
orientation and rejecting otherwise qualified applicants who answered 
they were gay or lesbian.43 Such anti-gay policies were common for 
police departments in both major cities and small towns.44 
Private employers, too, asked applicants about their sexual 
orientation. In the 1990s, Target Stores required applicants for security 
officer positions to answer a series of true-or-false questions, including 
“I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex.”45 Other job 
applicants asked about their sexual orientation include pharmacists, 
 
 40.  Id. at 12-50 (citing HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION: 
A SPECIAL REPORT FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FEATURING CASES OF 
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN AMERICA’S WORKPLACES (2001), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ENDA-12-Examples-Sep-2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5TDN-W6TW]).  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id.   
 43.  For example, in City of Dallas v. England,  
England applied for a position with the Dallas Police Department in 1989. She was 
invited to interview for the position and, when asked about her sexual orientation, she 
responded truthfully that she was a lesbian. The interviewer then informed England 
that under the police department’s hiring policy her homosexuality made her ineligible 
for employment. 
846 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (footnote omitted); see also Childers v. Dall. Police 
Dept., 513 F. Supp. 134, 136 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (declining to hire an applicant who, in response to 
a question from an interviewer, identified himself as gay), aff’d mem., 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 44.  See, e.g., Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 143 (“Police departments 
traditionally discriminate against gay men and lesbians both in hiring and promotion decisions in 
ways that affect both police officers and administrators.”); Woodland v. City of Hous., 940 F.2d 
134, 137 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting how the City of Houston’s Police Department, Fire Department, 
and Airport Police Division asked job applicants about “homosexual behavior” during mandatory 
polygraph exams); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 509, 513 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Perfect Storm] (“Police departments and 
prosecutors’ offices refused to hire gay men and lesbians, reasoning that sodomy laws rendered 
them criminals, and criminals could not be hired in any field related to law enforcement.”).  
 45.  Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 79–80 (Ct. App. 1991), dismissed as 
moot in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (Nov. 10, 1993). 
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police officers, teachers,46 coaches, camp counselors,47 administrators, 
clerical workers, health program coordinators,48 software development 
administrators,49 and even professional football players.50 
Today, major employers continue to ask applicants and employees 
about their sexual orientation in order to discriminate against gay job 
candidates or employees.51 The discrimination can take the form of 
being denied a new job or being terminated from an existing job.52 In 
one of the more infamous anti-gay purges by an American company, 
the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain announced an official policy for its 
one hundred restaurants in the 1990s: it refused “to continue to employ 
individuals . . . whose sexual preferences fail to demonstrate normal 
heterosexual values.”53 To implement this policy, “[t]hroughout the 
chain, individual store managers, acting on orders of corporate 
officials, began conducting brief, one-on-one interviews with their 
employees to see if any were in violation of the new policy.”54 
 
 46.  See Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 626 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 47.  See Jennifer Levitz, Fundraiser Puts Scout Policy on Gays Back in Spotlight, 
PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 1, 1999, at A1 (“The local scouting organization came under attack this 
summer when officials fired an Eagle Scout from his job at Camp Yawgoog after his boss asked 
him if he was gay, and he said yes.”). 
 48.  See Klimer v. Haymarket/Maryville, No. 91-E-117, 1993 WL 839792, at *1 (Chi. Comm’n 
on Hum. Rels., June 16, 1993). 
 49.  See Kemba J. Dunham, Stay-at-Home Dads Fight Stigma, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2003, 
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB106184492170212200.html [https://perma.cc/ZU4R-9H8J]. 
 50.  In 2010, the Cincinnati Bengals asked a draft prospect to disclose his sexual orientation 
before being drafted. Team Executives Ask NFL Draft Prospects the Darnedest Things, NFL (May 
10, 2010, 11:15 AM), https://www.nfl.com/news/team-executives-ask-nfl-draft-prospects-the-
darnedest-things-09000d5d817f452b [https://perma.cc/N98Q-FLM3]; Another Fun Rookie 
Interview Question: Sexual Orientation, NBC SPORTS (May 5, 2010, 4:44 PM), 
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/05/05/another-fun-rookie-interview-question-sexual-
orientation [https://perma.cc/5H54-4KC5]. 
 51.  See infra notes 220–25 and accompanying text; see also Gregory B. Lewis, Barriers to 
Security Clearances for Gay Men and Lesbians: Fear of Blackmail or Fear of Homosexuals?, 11 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 539, 551 (2001) (noting that interviewers “who said that 
homosexual relations were always wrong were nearly three times as likely as those who said they 
were not wrong at all to say the government definitely should have the right to ask detailed, 
personal questions about sexual orientation”). 
 52.  See Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (“As a part 
of the hiring process, Dr. Hyman is said to have inquired into two applicants’ sexual orientation 
intending to take this fact into account in reaching an employment decision.”), vacated on standing 
grounds, 53 F. App’x 740 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 53.  John Howard, The Cracker Barrel Restaurants, in UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING 
DIVERSITY 166, 167 (Carol P. Harvey & M. June Allard eds., 6th ed. 2015) (alteration in original). 
 54.  Id. 
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2021  4:16 PM 
2021] THE GAY PERJURY TRAP 15 
Employees who answered truthfully that they were gay were 
terminated on the spot without any severance.55  
For many employees, someone other than a boss or supervisor 
may inquire into sexual orientation in the workplace. For example, 
coworkers have asked fellow employees whether they were gay.56 
These inquiries into sexual orientation often arise in the context of 
anti-gay slurs being hurled at an employee.57 In this scenario, the 
employee is subjected to a combination of verbal assault and sexual 
inquisition.58 The question can also come from nonemployees, such as 
students in educational settings.59 Whatever the source of the question 
about homosexuality, if answered affirmatively, the gay worker is 
subject to harassment and termination. 
It is hardly surprising that in the years before the Stonewall riots 
and during the first decades of the modern gay rights movement 
employers sought to identify and discriminate against LGB individuals. 
Public and private employers alike asked both broadly worded and 
offensively pointed questions regarding sexuality. When asked about 
sexual orientation, gay people had a choice: tell the truth and be denied 
a job, or lie. Many lied. If one needed the job, lying was the rational 
decision. But this meant one got the job based on a lie—a lie that could 
come back to haunt the employee.  
 
 55.  See id. Some employees weren’t even asked; they were just terminated for being gay. 
Michael Cunningham, If You’re Queer and You’re Not Angry in 1992, You’re Not Paying 
Attention; If You’re Straight It May be Hard to Figure Out What All the Shouting’s About., 17 
MOTHER JONES 60, 64 (1992) (“In all, eighteen lesbians and gay men were fired from Cracker 
Barrel’s outlets. Some managers called the employees they suspected into their offices and 
formally asked if they were homosexual. Others just convened staff meetings and announced that 
certain employees were being terminated in accordance with company policy.”). 
 56.  Bryan v. Mem’l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., OATH Index No. 183/06 (N.Y.C. Comm’n 
on Hum. Rts. July 25, 2006), 2006 WL 6632708, at *4 (N.Y.C. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. July 25, 
2006) (describing police officers asking their fellow officers whether they were gay), aff’d, 
Comm’n Decision (Sept. 29, 2006); STEPHEN LEINEN, GAY COPS 49 (1993). 
 57.  See Bahena v. Adjustable Clamp Co., No. 99-E-111, 2003 WL 23529561, at *3 & *6 (Chi. 
Comm’n on Hum. Rels. July 16, 2003) (observing coworkers asking another employee whom they 
suspected of being gay “why he was” gay). 
 58.  See, e.g., Fontánez-Núñez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(“According to Fontánez, Natal also made offensive comments referencing homosexual activity, 
once noting that Fontánez was a pharmacist and expressing an opinion, in vulgar terms, that all 
pharmacists are homosexuals. Fontánez stated that co-workers would then call him (Fontánez) 
gay or would ask him whether he was gay.”). 
 59.  KIM I. MILLS WITH DARYL HERRSCHAFT, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE STATE 
OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED AMERICANS 25 
(1999). 
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2. Arrest Records.  Historically, some employers justified their 
inquiries into homosexuality as part of a larger inquiry into applicants’ 
criminal activities. At the beginning of the gay rights movement, all 
state penal codes contained statutes that proscribed private consensual 
sodomy between adults.60 Although criminal charges were not widely 
prosecuted—due primarily to the private nature of the illegal 
conduct—police often used sodomy laws to arrest people suspected of 
being gay.61 Police departments in many jurisdictions executed sting 
operations employing decoys—cops who pretended to be gay in an 
effort to convince gay men to make passes, at which time they would 
be arrested for soliciting illegal sex.62 Other arrests were not for actual 
sexual activity or solicitation, but for visiting a gay bar, innocently 
touching or dancing with a member of the same sex, or anything else 
that a police officer considered “indecent.”63 In other words, arrests 
were not necessarily for illegal sexual conduct, but rather for any 
observed indicator of homosexuality. LGBT historian Eric Cervini 
reports on this period: “After World War II, homosexual arrests—
including those for sodomy, dancing, kissing, or holding hands—
occurred at a rate of one every ten minutes, each hour, each day, for 
fifteen years. In sum, one million citizens found themselves persecuted 
by the American state for sexual deviation.”64  
Police departments maintained vice squads whose sole function 
was to find and expose gay men. For example, during the post-war era, 
Washington, D.C., employed a so-called “morals squad” of four 
policemen working full-time to detect and arrest gay men.65 Some 
 
 60.  Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 106. 
 61.  Id. at 127–35.  
 62.  NAN ALAMILLA BOYD, WIDE OPEN TOWN: A HISTORY OF QUEER SAN FRANCISCO TO 
1965, at 137–38, 207–08 (2003); Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 131–32. See generally 
JOHN GERASSI, BOYS OF BOISE: FUROR, VICE, AND FOLLY IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1966) 
(discussing use of anti-gay police stings in Boise, Idaho during the 1950s); MARTIN S. WEINBERG 
& COLIN J. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS: THEIR PROBLEMS AND ADAPTATIONS 48 (1974) 
(noting that the California criminal statute was used “frequently in connection with arrests 
involving the soliciting of decoys by homosexuals”). These tactics continue today. See infra note 
298. 
 63.  Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 389; BOYD, supra note 62, at 137–38.  
 64.  ERIC CERVINI, THE DEVIANT’S WAR: THE HOMOSEXUAL VS. THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 4 (2020). 
 65.  Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 388. 
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officials complained that this number was insufficient to confront the 
“homosexual menace.”66  
Several vice squads existed primarily to create arrest records used 
to terminate gay men from federal employment.67 D.C. police officials 
estimated that the nation’s capital was home to five thousand gay men, 
three-fourths of whom worked for the federal government.68 These 
officials saw reducing that percentage as part of their mission. Local 
law enforcement, the FBI, and the Civil Service Commission worked 
in tandem to eliminate gay people from the federal workforce. The 
Commission chairman  
suggested that if local police departments would report all morals 
arrests with sufficient detail to the FBI, then the FBI could give the 
information to the Civil Service Commission. The commission could 
then pass the information on to relevant agencies to remove current 
employees, and the FBI could maintain the lists so that job applicants 
could be screened against them. Indeed, [one D.C. police lieutenant] 
testified that he was already furnishing names and fingerprints of all 
morals arrests to the FBI.69 
For example, in 1963, the D.C. morals squad arrested National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) budget analyst 
Clifford Norton for allegedly picking up another man in Lafayette 
Circle.70 The police, unbeknownst to Norton, brought NASA’s security 
chief to observe their interrogation.71 Norton was subsequently 
transferred to NASA headquarters and questioned for several more 
hours, through the night until 6:30 in the morning, about his sexual 
orientation.72 Despite a fifteen-year record of unblemished 
government service, NASA fired Norton for his “immoral, indecent 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 138.  
 68.  Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 388. 
 69.  Id.; see also LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY 
PEOPLE ON TRIAL 84 (1998) (noting that the FBI turned over the names of suspected 
homosexuals to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, which used the information to terminate gay 
employees). 
 70.  Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 391; CERVINI, supra note 64, at 303. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id.; David K. Johnson, “Homosexual Citizens”: Washington’s Gay Community 
Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall/Winter, 1994–1995, at 44, 45 [hereinafter Johnson, 
Homosexual Citizens]; see Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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and disgraceful conduct.”73 Gay men who confessed their sexual 
orientation during such an interrogation were summarily fired, no 
matter how valuable their service or skill set, even when their bosses 
supported them.74 Government investigators used this basic process of 
interrogation against thousands of gay civil servants in the nation’s 
capital, almost all of whom “resigned” quietly in the hopes of perhaps 
finding a job in another city where their sexual orientation was 
unknown.75  
While the D.C. morals squad inflicted the most damage, many 
cities followed its lead by maintaining anti-gay squads.76 The linkage 
between arrest and job termination was, in fact, a national 
phenomenon. Professor John D’Emilio explains that the FBI  
took the initiative of establishing liaison with police departments 
throughout the country. Not content with acting only on requests to 
screen particular individuals, it adopted a preventive strategy that 
justified widespread surveillance. The FBI sought out friendly vice 
squad officers who supplied arrest records on morals charges, 
regardless of whether convictions had ensued.77  
Federal government officials “were instructed not only to check police 
records but to establish a ‘close working relationship’ with the vice 
squad in their area and to be aware that in some jurisdictions acts of 
sex perversion might only be prosecuted as ‘disorderly conduct.’”78 The 
goal was to use arrest records to identify gay men.79 
Adverse employment action based on arrest was not limited to 
government jobs. Private employers, too, requested arrest records, and 
those applicants whose arrests indicated homosexuality were not 
 
 73.  Johnson, Homosexual Citizens, supra note 72, at 45. 
 74.  See BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 129 (discussing the entrapment, interrogation, and 
dismissal of Bill Youngblood, “a technician for the Department of Defense on their guided missile 
and atomic bomb programs”). 
 75.  See Johnson, Homosexual Citizens, supra note 72, at 47 (explaining that after 
investigators accused a worker of being gay, “the civil servant was usually granted ‘the 
opportunity’ to resign quietly”). 
 76.  See Jon J. Gallo et al., The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical 
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. REV. 643, 688–725 
(1966); Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 389. 
 77.  D’EMILIO, supra note 36, at 46.  
 78.  JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 72–73. 
 79.  Although LGB individuals of any gender could fall victim to the gay perjury trap, law 
enforcement officials targeted men.  
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hired.80 Some New York employers hired private agencies to 
investigate job applicants for any signs of homosexuality in either their 
daily habits or their arrest and draft records.81 More generally, in an 
early 1970s survey, a quarter of over one thousand gay men nationwide 
responded that they had been arrested on charges related to 
homosexuality, and more than 15 percent reported that they had lost a 
job when employers learned of their homosexuality.82 
In sum, gay job applicants rationally sought to conceal any prior 
arrests that would expose their sexual orientation. But such 
concealment, if successful, could entail negative consequences down 
the line.  
3. Association Memberships.  Some employers also sought 
circumstantial evidence of sexual orientation by asking about 
applicants’ memberships in private associations. Given the 
discrimination faced by gay Americans, many nascent gay rights 
organizations maintained strict confidentiality among members, 
including the use of code names so that even group members did not 
know the actual identities of their fellow members.83 As the stigma 
against gay people began to dissipate in some cities and regions, 
members became more open with each other, though still closeted to 
the outside world.  
The FBI attempted to infiltrate early gay rights groups in order to 
identify members and to monitor their activities.84 The Mattachine 
 
 80.  See WEINBERG & WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 280 (“In the United States, for example, 
if one has ever been arrested for a homosexual offense, whether convicted or not, he may find his 
employment opportunities limited. Many employers, both public and private, ask whether a job 
applicant has ever been arrested.”). 
 81.  TOBY MAROTTA, THE POLITICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 197 (1981). 
 82.  WEINBERG & WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 108–09. Five percent reported more than one 
job termination because employers discovered their sexual orientation. Id. at 109.  
 83.  See JOANNE MYERS, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE LESBIAN AND GAY 
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 8 (2013) (noting that while the two founders of the lesbian 
organization Daughters of Bilitis did not use aliases, “the names of the others remain[ed] 
confidential,” and that, in early gay organizations, “members usually adopted code names because 
of fear of harassment”); STUART TIMMONS, THE TROUBLE WITH HARRY HAY: FOUNDER OF 
THE MODERN GAY MOVEMENT 141–51 (1990) (recounting that the Mattachine Society “was to 
be composed of members ‘anonymous to the community at large, and to each other if they so 
choose’”).  
 84.  Cf. Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 390 (“FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover played 
a leading role in justifying the crackdown and pursued homophile and gay liberation organizations 
for decades (perhaps in response to a fear that a small homophile magazine, One, would ‘out’ him 
as a homosexual).” (citation omitted)). 
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Society of Washington, an early gay rights group, used code names for 
its members in order to reduce the risk of FBI infiltrators determining 
members’ true identities, as well as to prevent members from being 
pressured into exposing their co-members in exchange for leniency 
when threatened by the FBI or a government employer.85 The FBI 
sometimes asked government employees whether they belonged to 
Mattachine.86 Some gay government employees were afraid of lying to 
the FBI and admitted their membership in Mattachine.87 But during 
the 1960s, listing a gay rights organization on one’s job application 
would render that person ineligible for government employment.88  
These organizations provided an opportunity for employers to 
make inquiries about applicants’ proclivities. By requiring job 
applicants to disclose all current and prior organization memberships, 
employers asked indirectly about sexual orientation. A gay person who 
had ever belonged to a gay-related organization faced a dilemma. If a 
gay applicant answered honestly about membership in a gay rights 
organization, an employer would construe this as an admission of 
homosexuality, and no job offer would issue.89 Alternatively, if one 
failed to disclose prior or current memberships, the gay perjury trap 
had been set.  
B.  Springing the Gay Perjury Trap: Punishing the Lie 
When asked about sexual orientation, many gay job applicants tell 
untruths in order to avoid being denied a job. This concealment, 
however, allows employers who subsequently fire a gay employee to 
claim that they terminated the employee because she lied about her 
sexual orientation. This represents a gay perjury trap—the pretextual 
assertion by the employer that the issue is not the employee’s sexual 
orientation, but her mendacity. This shifts focus from the employer’s 
 
 85.  Cf. CERVINI, supra note 64, at 90 (noting that Mattachine members were “very careful 
about divulging their true names and consequently they usually use codes names at the meetings 
and when they receive mail from the Society”).  
 86.  Id. at 90–91. 
 87.  See id. at 91. 
 88.  See BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 189 (observing that Otto Ulrich was terminated from his 
Department of Defense job when government investigators realized that he had listed his 
membership in Mattachine). 
 89.  See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(“Plaintiff Weston, a homosexual, has a Secret clearance and in 1984 submitted an application for 
Top Secret clearance as required for his job at Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Lockheed never 
forwarded his application to the DoD because his application revealed he belonged to a gay 
organization.”). 
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anti-gay policy to the individual gay employee’s “dishonesty.” This 
section provides historic examples of the gay perjury trap in action, 
with gay workers being punished for concealing their sexual 
orientation, their memberships in gay organizations, and the details of 
gay-related arrests.  
1. Punished for Concealing Sexual Orientation.  As discussed 
above, public and private employers have long sought to rid their 
workforces of gay personnel. Federal intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies have been particularly aggressive in investigating their own 
staffs in the hopes of punishing gay employees who evaded detection 
during the hiring process. Thousands were harassed and terminated. 
Very few ever fought back. Frank Buttino did. An FBI special agent 
for decades, Buttino performed undercover work, including 
investigating espionage and terrorism.90 During his tenure, he received 
four special commendations, among other honors.91 
Buttino’s unblemished career with the agency came to a halt in the 
1990s after the FBI’s San Diego office received an anonymous tip 
accusing Buttino of being gay.92 The FBI began an investigation of its 
own agent, focusing largely on one piece of evidence: a love letter 
written from one man to another.93 The FBI set the gay perjury trap by 
handing Buttino a form that stated in part: “This inquiry pertains to an 
anonymous allegation of homosexual activity.”94 The document said 
Buttino “had to answer all questions fully and truthfully or face 
possible dismissal.”95 When asked by FBI investigators, Buttino denied 
that he had authored a romantic letter to another man.96 Five weeks 
later, however, Buttino corrected himself and acknowledged having 
written the letter in question.97 But it was too late. The FBI asserted 
that because Buttino had been “deceptive” during their investigation, 
 
 90.  Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  John D. Cramer, Ex-FBI Agent, Fired for Being Gay, Fights To Get Back Job, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at 1. 
 93.  BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 94–95. 
 94.  Id. at 95.  
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 300. 
 97.  Id. Buttino explained that he had initially denied being gay because he feared admitting 
his homosexuality would result in his termination. Id. 
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he would lose his Top Secret security clearance and consequently, his 
job.98 
Unlike the many gay FBI agents who had been terminated or 
forced to resign, Buttino defended himself, bringing a lawsuit 
challenging the FBI’s discriminatory policy.99 The FBI defended its 
action by arguing that Buttino was not terminated for being gay but for 
being deceptive about being gay.100 The FBI argued that there could be 
no constitutional infirmity in its firing of Buttino because Buttino had 
been deceptive in affirmatively concealing his homosexuality.101  
The FBI was being disingenuous, however, when it claimed that it 
was terminating Buttino for his mendacity. Under the FBI’s policy at 
the time, if Buttino had been truthful at the outset, the FBI would have 
fired him.102 In these circumstances, it would be irrational for any gay 
FBI agent to acknowledge his or her sexual orientation to FBI officials.  
The FBI’s alleged reliance on Buttino’s deception was mere 
pretext. The FBI’s unhealthy obsession with homosexuality was 
illustrated by its blanket policy against gay agents and its treatment of 
suspected violators. Agents suspected of homosexuality—but with 
otherwise sterling records—were investigated mercilessly and 
drummed out of the agency.103 Although the FBI enforced its anti-gay 
policy for decades, Buttino was the first agent to fight back.104 
The district court in Buttino’s lawsuit noted that one special agent, 
a heterosexual individual who had worked for the FBI for twenty-six 
years, had stated “unequivocally that the FBI did, during my years as a 
Special Agent, have a policy of discriminating against gays, or what we 
in the FBI often referred to as homosexual deviates, queers, fags, 
faggots, fruits, punks and limp wrists.”105 The FBI’s 1990 internal 
 
 98.  Id. at 300, 309 n.2 (“Because all FBI employees must have a Top Secret security 
clearance, plaintiff’s employment was, by necessity, terminated after his security clearance was 
revoked.”). 
 99.  See id. at 298–300.  
 100.  Irvin Molotsky, Gay Workers Gain Bias Rule at F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at A29 
(“The bureau has responded that the agent, Frank Buttino, was dismissed because he gave 
deceptive answers when he was first asked if he was homosexual, not because he was gay.”). 
 101.  See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 300–01. 
 102.  See CHARLES, supra note 35, at xv. 
 103.  See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 304–05. 
 104.  Cramer, supra note 92. 
 105.  Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 310 n.5. 
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employment policy mirrored its external investigative policies of the 
1960s: search and destroy. 
Furthermore, the FBI generally treated suspected gay agents far 
differently—and worse—than it treated heterosexual agents suspected 
of sexual indiscretions. The questions addressed to gay employees were 
far more intrusive and invasive than those asked of straight agents.106 
Agents accused of homosexual activity were asked about “specific 
private sexual acts” and their “childhood sexuality.”107 The questions 
could be quite graphic. For example, the FBI investigators pressed 
Buttino with statements like “We need to know the kind of sex you 
engage in with other men.”108 The penalties exacted, too, were 
disproportionately harsh, as  
the FBI’s own documents . . . indicate[] that the measures taken 
against Buttino (revocation of his security clearance and dismissal) 
were more severe than the FBI otherwise takes in cases of similar—
or more serious—findings of “lack of candor” and improper 
disclosure of information. Those documents suggest that the typical 
punishment for indiscretions of roughly similar seriousness appears 
to be censure, probation of six months to one year, and suspension 
without pay for 7 to 60 days.109  
The FBI did not terminate heterosexual agents who lied about their 
sexual indiscretions.110 Given the so-called lack of candor resulted in 
wildly harsher penalties based on the target’s presumed 
homosexuality, the FBI was punishing sexual orientation—not 
deception.111 
 
 106. Cf. Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 258–59 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (documenting how the FBI 
“repeatedly asked [a female agent] . . . whether she had had sexual relations with . . . [a male 
agent]” but apparently not asking about specific details of the alleged encounters).  
 107.  Id. at 305. 
 108.  BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 115. The FBI’s obsession with specific acts mimics Florida’s 
hunt for gay teachers during the Cold War. See Braukman, supra note 38, at 559 (“Investigators 
scrutinized virtually every conceivable aspect of their targets’ sex lives, compelling them to 
describe specific acts and the role played in each (most often articulated by questioners as 
‘passive’ or ‘aggressive’) to measure their potential for corrupting Florida’s children.”); see also 
id. at 568 (“Then came the coaxing and prodding to elicit intimate details about sexual activity 
and exhaustive naming of specific acts performed with other women.”). 
 109.  Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 304 (citation omitted). 
 110.  See BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 290. 
 111.  See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 308 (“The court cannot help but wonder, moreover, whether 
there is anything to indicate that Buttino’s lack of candor would ever have been an issue but for 
the FBI’s history of anti-gay discrimination . . . .”). 
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The Buttino v. FBI112 case illustrates fundamental aspects of the 
gay perjury trap. The FBI questioned all job applicants about their 
sexual orientation and steadfastly refused to hire anyone who 
acknowledged being gay.113 Any gay agent who made it through the 
initial screen worked in fear that the question would be asked again 
because candor and lack of candor were punished equally—via 
revocation of security clearance and termination from employment. 
The district court recognized the catch-22 in which gay agents were 
caught, and the judge “question[ed] . . . the rationality of a policy which 
punishes gay employees for being less than candid about their 
homosexuality when it is undisputed that . . . the FBI would clearly 
have purged any employee for being candid about one’s 
homosexuality.”114 In essence, the FBI forced the employee into this 
“lack of candor” through its anti-gay policies and then subsequently 
punished this same “lack of candor” that it had compelled.115 
Ultimately, the Buttino court recognized that the FBI’s revocation of a 
security clearance based on a lack of candor regarding sexuality was “a 
mere pretext for the implementation of a discriminatory policy.”116 In 
1993, Attorney General Janet Reno announced an end to the FBI’s 
official policy against gay employees, though de facto discrimination 
remains a problem.117 
 
 112.  Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
 113.  See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text. 
 114.  Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 308. 
 115.  Id. at 312 (“[T]here is a viable question as to whether plaintiff’s ‘lack of candor’ and 
‘uncooperativeness’ would ever have been an issue but for the FBI’s alleged anti-gay practices.”). 
 116.  Id. at 301. The district court certified Buttino’s case as a class action against the FBI, 
challenging the agency’s anti-gay policies as a whole. Buttino v. FBI, No. C–90—1639SBA, 1992 
WL 12013803, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1992). The class action was rendered moot when the 
Justice Department under Attorney General Janet Reno changed the FBI antidiscrimination 
policy to include sexual orientation. Cf. Reno Orders FBI To Discard Anti-Homosexual Hiring 
Policy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at A18 (“Reno has ordered the FBI to discard a policy making 
it difficult for homosexuals to be hired, and the bureau now will forbid discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. . . . Reno’s statement came as a federal class action case brought by former 
FBI agent Frank Buttino, 48, began in San Francisco.”). Subsequently, Buttino settled his 
individual lawsuit. Litigation Notes – Federal, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay L. Ass’n 
of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1994, http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/legal/lgln/1994/04.94 
[https://perma.cc/2MV2-GW5D]. Under the settlement, Buttino received some damages, but not 
reinstatement. See id. (“In exchange for dropping his request for reinstatement, Frank Buttino 
will receive a cash settlement of about $100,000, $53,000 in legal fees, and a civil service pension 
when he reaches age 62 in 2007.”).  
 117.  See Molotsky, supra note 100.  
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2. Punished for Concealing Membership in Gay Rights 
Association.  In addition to penalizing false denials of homosexuality, 
some employers have sought to punish concealing indicia of 
homosexuality, such as belonging to a gay rights organization. In 1972, 
Joseph Acanfora III graduated from Penn State with the goal of being 
a high school science teacher.118 His junior year had been momentous 
for two reasons. First, Acanfora changed his major from meteorology 
to education, so that he could pursue a profession in which he worked 
with people.119 Second, he joined a student organization, Homophiles 
of Penn State (“HOPS”), which sought to increase public 
understanding of homosexuality.120 When Penn State refused to 
recognize the group, its members—including Acanfora—brought a 
successful lawsuit against the university.121  
Because Acanfora had acknowledged his sexual orientation 
during that litigation, state officials debated Acanfora’s suitability for 
teacher certification.122 They ultimately forwarded his application for 
certification to the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education without 
recommendation.123 While the certification process proceeded out of 
the public eye in Pennsylvania, Acanfora successfully applied for a 
teaching position at a junior high school in Montgomery County, 
Maryland.124 The school was satisfied with Acanfora’s classroom 
performance as a science teacher, and Acanfora taught without 
incident.125 
After Acanfora had been teaching science at a junior high school 
for several weeks, the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education held a press 
conference and announced that Acanfora’s application for teacher 
certification would be approved despite his homosexuality.126 Upon 
 
 118.  See Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 844–45 (D. Md. 1973), aff’d, 491 F.2d 
498 (4th Cir. 1974).  
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 845. 
 121.  See Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thomas Clark sat on 
the three-judge panel by designation. Id. at 499. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 500. 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 845–46 (“The Board has in no way attacked Acanfora’s 
classroom performance, nor has it charged Acanfora with bringing up the subject of 
homosexuality in the school environment. The evidence is that he is competent and that he did 
not discuss his private life while at school.”). 
 126.  Id. at 845. 
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learning that Acanfora was gay from the Pennsylvania official’s press 
conference, which seemed designed to invite discrimination against 
Acanfora, the Montgomery County Deputy Superintendent of Schools 
transferred Acanfora out of the classroom and into administrative 
work, where he would have no contact with students.127 The transfer to 
a nonteaching position, even without a loss of salary, was “at heart, the 
functional equivalent of an injury inflicted upon plaintiff’s reputation, 
an implicit allegation that his homosexuality determines unfitness to 
teach.”128 
In response to this adverse job action, Acanfora granted several 
journalists’ requests for interviews, including a segment on 60 
Minutes.129 At a time in American history when homosexuality was still 
equated with criminality and moral deviance, Acanfora attempted to 
increase public understanding of homosexuality. Among his many 
television, radio, and press interviews, Acanfora appeared with his 
parents on a PBS program to discuss how gay people and their families 
confront problems like discrimination and societal intolerance.130 
Throughout his interviews, Acanfora “stressed that he had not, and 
would not, discuss his sexuality with the students.”131  
When Acanfora sued the Montgomery County Board of 
Education to reinstate his teaching position, the school board argued 
that it would neither reinstate Acanfora nor renew his contract because 
his appearances in the media had sparked controversy.132 Reversing the 
district court, the Fourth Circuit held that Acanfora had a First 
Amendment right to speak to the media as he did because “a teacher’s 
comments on public issues concerning schools that are neither 
knowingly false nor made in reckless disregard of the truth afford no 
ground for dismissal when they do not impair the teacher’s 
performance of his duties or interfere with the operation of the 
schools.”133 The Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]here is no evidence that 
 
 127.  Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500. 
 128.  Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 857; see id. at 849–50 (“And it is no defense that the Board 
merely transferred Acanfora, for the measurement of abridgment of constitutional rights is not 
confined to dollars and cents. To rule otherwise would facilitate subtle circumvention of the law 
so carefully developed by the highest court of this land.”). 
 129.  Id. at 846. 
 130.  Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
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the interviews disrupted the school, substantially impaired his capacity 
as a teacher, or gave the school officials reasonable grounds to forecast 
that these results would flow from what he said.”134 The court held that 
the First Amendment protected Acanfora’s public statements and, 
thus, the school board could not penalize Acanfora for his press 
interviews.135  
In anticipation of this holding, the school board advanced a second 
argument: Acanfora’s deception. In its employment application, the 
school board requested applicants to list their past and present 
organizational affiliations.136 While Acanfora listed his student 
membership in the Pennsylvania State Education Association, he did 
not list HOPS.137 Acanfora refrained from disclosing his membership 
in HOPS precisely because he believed that the school board would 
discriminate against him.138 During the litigation, the school board 
relied on Acanfora’s omission to justify its punishment even though it 
was unaware that Acanfora had been a member of HOPS—and had 
consciously decided not to mention it on his application—until after the 
deputy superintendent had taken the adverse action against 
Acanfora.139 Instead, according to a school board official, the decision 
to remove Acanfora from the classroom was based on the fact that he 
“was an advertised, activist homosexual.”140 
By invoking Acanfora’s alleged deception, the school sought to 
spring a gay perjury trap. The strategy worked. The Fourth Circuit held 
that the school board could transfer Acanfora to a non-teaching 
position because of Acanfora’s decision to conceal his sexual 
orientation despite the board not knowing of Acanfora’s HOPS 
omission when they decided to transfer him.141 The Fourth Circuit used 
 
 134.  Id. at 500–01. 
 135.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 136.  Id. at 501. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See id. at 501 (“[H]e realized that this information would be significant, but he believed 
disclosure would foreclose his opportunity to be considered for employment on an equal basis 
with other applicants.”). 
 139.  Id. at 503 n.4. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See id. at 503 (“It was Acanfora’s testimony that furnished the school system a factual 
basis for the defense of misrepresentation. After Acanfora testified, the superintendent of schools 
unequivocally assigned the conscious withholding of information as a reason for his unwillingness 
to reassign Acanfora to a teaching position.”); see also id. (“We conclude, therefore, that the 
school system should not be prejudiced because it did not include in the administrative file, as a 
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Acanfora’s decision to conceal his sexual orientation as an excuse not 
to reach the merits of Acanfora’s claim that the school district’s policy 
was unconstitutional.142 The court reasoned:  
Not every omission of information in an employment application will 
preclude an employee from attacking the constitutionality of action 
taken by the governing body that employs him. But here Acanfora 
wrongfully certified that his application was accurate to the best of his 
knowledge when he knew that it contained a significant omission. His 
intentional withholding of facts about his affiliation with [HOPS] is 
inextricably linked to his attack on the constitutionality of the school 
system’s refusal to employ homosexuals as teachers. Acanfora 
purposely misled the school officials so he could circumvent, not 
challenge, what he considers to be their unconstitutional employment 
practices. He cannot now invoke the process of the court to obtain a 
ruling on an issue that he practiced deception to avoid.143 
The Fourth Circuit in Acanfora v. Board of Education of 
Montgomery County144 held that if a gay applicant conceals his 
sexuality to be hired by an employer with a policy against hiring gay 
people, then the applicant does not have standing to challenge the 
employer’s anti-gay policy.145 This legitimized the gay perjury trap set 
by the school board, which required applicants to sign—in the presence 
of a notary, no less—the following statement: “I understand that 
falsification of any information submitted on this application shall be 
cause for dismissal from service.”146 One school official swore in an 
affidavit: 
This litigation by reason of plaintiff’s false application, is contrived in 
every sense of the word. He ought not to bootstrap his way into a 
constitutional issue out of such untruthfulness. Had he been truthful, 
defendants would not have been involved in this litigation as they 
would not have hired him in the first place.147 
 
reason for denying Acanfora a teaching position, information about his motives that were known 
to Acanfora but unknown to the school officials until he testified.”).  
 142.  Id. at 499. 
 143.  Id. at 503–04. 
 144.  Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974). 
 145.  Id. at 504 (quoting Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 6 (1938)).  
 146.  Id. at 501 n.1. 
 147.  Id. at 503 n.3. 
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Shockingly, the school official scolded Acanfora for lying because, but 
for the lie, the school district could have quietly exercised its anti-gay 
policy and avoided litigation by not hiring Acanfora in the first place.  
Acanfora ended up the victim of a gay perjury trap.148 If he had 
told the truth, the school board—by its own admission—would have 
discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation.149 But 
because he omitted his membership in HOPS, he suffered the same 
fate. Although the school’s anti-gay policy would now violate Title VII, 
inquiry into memberships remains a method of setting the gay perjury 
trap. 
3. Punished for Not Elaborating on Arrest Record.  Employers 
have historically used accusations of deception regarding arrest records 
to justify terminating gay employees. Although police departments 
across the country arrested approximately one million gay men for 
offenses related to their sexual orientation,150 Frank Kameny 
represents one of the most famous cases. Kameny had been a 
university professor before applying to work for the Army Map Service 
in the late 1950s.151 On the job application’s request for arrest history, 
Kameny responded he had been arrested in San Francisco for 
“disorderly conduct,” but the charge had been dismissed.152 Kameny 
was hired and started work as an astronomer just before the Soviet 
Union’s launch of Sputnik started the space race.153  
After only a few months, federal investigators approached 
Kameny with the news that the Civil Service Commission had received 
information indicating he was homosexual.154 When asked for details 
 
 148.  See ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER 53 
(1995) (“[T]he court upheld the transfer because he had failed to disclose his membership of a 
gay student organization in his application for a teaching position, in order to circumvent the 
school’s policy of refusing to employ gay teachers, which his ‘deception’ precluded him from 
challenging!”); JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS 
V. THE SUPREME COURT 179 (2001) (“Acanfora could not challenge the constitutionality of an 
anti-gay employment policy because he had used ‘deception’ to try to avoid it . . . .”). 
 149.  Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 501 (“The school officials admit that if Acanfora had revealed his 
affiliation with the Homophiles they would not have employed him.”).  
 150.  CERVINI, supra note 64. 
 151.  See id. at 23–25. 
 152.  MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 51–52. 
 153.  Id.; see CERVINI, supra note 64, at 23–25. 
 154.  MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 52. 
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of his sex life, Kameny refused to answer, invoking his desire to keep 
his private life private.155 Soon thereafter, the government fired 
Kameny—not for being gay but for allegedly misrepresenting the 
nature of his prior arrest in San Francisco.156 Although the arrest 
documents only cited the penal code section without description, the 
government accused Kameny of being arrested for “lewd and indecent 
acts,” not “disorderly conduct,” as he had claimed on his application.157 
Both were catch phrases used by police departments to arrest men for 
suspected homosexuality.158 Yet, the government focused on the 
difference in nomenclature to accuse Kameny of dishonesty and to 
justify his termination on those grounds.159 
Kameny’s situation constituted a version of the gay perjury trap. 
If Kameny had been completely forthright in explaining that he had 
been arrested on suspicion of homosexual conduct, the government 
agency would never have hired him.160 Because Kameny acknowledged 
his arrest but stated the charge neutrally, the government agency 
accused him of duplicity and fired him on that basis. Kameny sued.161 
The Kameny case represents the government’s time-tested strategy of 
painting gay employees as blameworthy by attacking their alleged 
deception—all the while diverting attention from the government’s 
own exclusionary policy. Kameny lost his lawsuit but started a lifelong 
quest to hold the government accountable.162  
 
 155.  Id. Even after Frank Kameny had become the public face of the American gay rights 
movement, well into the 1970s and beyond, he avoided discussing his 1956 arrest. CERVINI, supra 
note 64, at 391. 
 156.  See CERVINI, supra note 64, at 28. 
 157.  MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 52; see CERVINI, supra note 64, at 28 (“Kameny 
had not been arrested for disorderly conduct, but rather for loitering and ‘lewd, indecent, or 
obscene’ conduct. According to the [Army Map Service], Kameny ‘failed to furnish a completely 
truthful answer,’ and for that reason, it terminated him.”).  
 158.  MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 52.  
 159.  See CERVINI, supra note 64, at 28 (“The AMS’s official reason [for terminating Kameny] 
appeared to have nothing to do with homosexuality. According to the AMS personnel officer, 
Kameny had falsified an official government document.”). 
 160.  See supra notes 18–35 and accompanying text. 
 161.  Kameny v. Brucker, 282 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
 162.  After Kameny lost his legal challenge to the government’s policy, he became the most 
prominent leader of the growing gay rights movement and its litigation strategy to get civil service 
protections for gay workers. See PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 55–56 (2000). 
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2021  4:16 PM 
2021] THE GAY PERJURY TRAP 31 
Federal officials used inquiries into arrest history as part of a gay 
perjury trap. In his study of the federal government’s anti-gay 
employment policies during the Cold War, Johnson explained: 
Applications for federal employment contained questions about past 
arrests and membership in subversive organizations that were 
designed less to solicit information than to provide a clear basis for 
firing those who lied about their pasts. If, for example, a gay male 
employee was found to have been arrested on a sex charge in a known 
gay cruising area but had failed to properly disclose it on his federal 
application form, he could be terminated for the criminal offense of 
falsifying a federal form. As Civil Service Commission general 
counsel H. Patrick Swygert acknowledged, “These questions are 
primarily used to impeach persons who falsely answered the 
questions in the negative or to dissuade persons from applying who 
believe their backgrounds might raise suspicions.”163  
For gay men desiring federal employment, a previous arrest under 
circumstances that indicated homosexuality could end one’s career 
before it even began. 
States sometimes employed a similar approach. At the close of the 
1960s, the Florida bar disbarred attorney Ronald Kay following his 
arrest for so-called homosexual solicitation.164 The bar association cited 
both the “homosexual activity” and Kay’s “lack of candor” because he 
tried to conceal the nature of his arrest from the bar, his family, and 
associates.165 Kay’s reluctance to be open about his homosexuality is 
hardly surprising given the loss of family, job, and status that gay men 
suffered when their sexual orientation was revealed.  
Failing to disclose an arrest that exposed one’s homosexuality 
could lead to even harsher consequences than losing one’s government 
job. For example, when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began 
investigating Charles Thayer, a high-level employee in the State 
Department, Hoover discovered evidence that Carmel Offie was also 
gay.166 Offie worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) 
Office of Policy Coordination.167 Hoover was working with Senator 
 
 163.  JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 138. 
 164.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 73–74 (1999). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  CHARLES, supra note 35, at 99. 
 167.  Id.  
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McCarthy to coerce the State Department to fire Thayer, whom 
Hoover considered a “degenerate” and a “high-class homosexual.”168 
Hoover and McCarthy learned of Offie’s homosexuality because Offie 
had been arrested on the morals charge of “hanging around the men’s 
room in Lafayette Park.”169 Without mentioning Offie’s name, 
McCarthy intimated on the Senate floor that there was a homosexual 
within the CIA.170 Understanding McCarthy’s threat, the White House 
demanded Offie’s immediate resignation on the “pretext . . . that, in 
1948, when filling out his application to work at the CIA, Offie failed 
to disclose his 1943 arrest in Lafayette Park.”171  
But Offie’s termination did not satiate Hoover, who demanded 
further investigations into Offie on the grounds he had gained his job 
at the CIA “by concealing his past . . . in failing to disclose his 1943 
arrest.”172 Hoover argued this constituted fraud.173 While the 
Department of Justice declined to pursue criminal charges, FBI agents 
continued to investigate Offie, following him “everywhere to ascertain 
his ‘contacts and activities.’”174 Not content with physical surveillance, 
“FBI officials authorized an illegal break-in of [Offie’s] Washington, 
DC, home either to search his personal papers and belongings or to 
surreptitiously install a microphone.”175 The FBI justified its pursuit of 
Offie as necessary to facilitate his prosecution for failing to report his 
1943 arrest on his employment application for the CIA.176  
4. Summary.  In general, it seems relatively noncontroversial to 
fire someone for lying.177 Some employers exploit this fact by requiring 
applicants to agree that if they have misrepresented or omitted any 
information called for in the hiring process, they are subject to 
“immediate discharge.”178 The employer then asks applicants if they 
 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 100. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at 101. 
 176.  See id. at 102. 
 177.  See infra notes 314–40 and accompanying text. 
 178.  The Head Start program in Dallas had such a requirement as well as suggesting that 
“Homosexual Conduct” disqualifies an applicant from employment. See Head Start of Greater 
Dallas, Inc. Application For Employment, HEAD START OF GREATER DALL., 
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are gay, refusing to hire honest gay people and later terminating any 
“deceptive” gay people who were hired. This creates a bind that can 
prevent gay people from working in their chosen field.  
C.  Preventing Escape from the Gay Perjury Trap  
It might seem that job applicants could escape the gay perjury trap 
simply by refusing to answer employers’ questions about sexual 
orientation. By taking this approach, gay applicants neither 
acknowledge their homosexuality nor lie about it. Historically, 
however, this third path has not been a viable option for three related 
reasons.  
First, some employers have interpreted the refusal to answer 
questions about sexual orientation as proof of homosexuality and have 
rejected the applicant as they would any other gay applicant. When the 
State Department’s Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs 
investigated employees suspected of homosexuality during the Cold 
War, officials could interrogate a government employee for hours; they 
often hooked him up to a polygraph machine and treated any refusal 
to answer explicit questions about sexual activity as an admission of 
homosexuality.179 For example, when government investigators asked 
about his private sexual activity, Frank Kameny declined to give the 
details of his sex life, responding that “as a matter of principle one’s 
private life is his own.”180 The government punished Kameny’s refusal 
to answer intensely personal questions about his so-called “moral 
conduct.”181 The Civil Service Commission had no actual evidence 
against Kameny; it “simply interpreted his refusals to cooperate during 
his . . . interrogations as admissions of guilt.”182 
Second, employers have historically treated an applicant’s refusal 
to answer questions about sexual orientation as itself disqualifying. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, applicants who refused to answer 
questions regarding homosexuality would not be hired, even if they had 
 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081121194059/http://www.hsgd.org/PDF/HSGDEmploymentAppl
ication.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJE7-CJPE] (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (“I understand that if the 
information I have provided is found to be false, misrepresented or omitted, it will be sufficient 
cause to cancel the employment process as immediate discharge from HEAD START of Greater 
Dallas, Inc. service when it is disclosed.”).  
 179.  See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 128. 
 180.  CERVINI, supra note 64, at 27. 
 181.  Id. at 41. 
 182.  Id. at 42. 
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been ranked as qualified following the federal civil service’s 
competitive examinations.183 For example, the D.C. Circuit held that a 
job applicant was properly “rated ineligible” for his “refusal to 
comment or to furnish information as to whether or not [he had] 
engaged in homosexual acts.”184 For public employees who had 
somehow “attract[ed] public notice,” the D.C. Circuit explained, “the 
Commission will ask, and presumably will disqualify, if either there is 
a refusal to respond or an admission of a homosexual act.”185  
More recently, under the FBI’s anti-gay policy, an applicant or 
employee who refused to answer explicit questions about same-sex 
sexual activity would be labeled “uncooperative”; this would serve as 
the basis for termination, as happened in Frank Buttino’s case in the 
1990s.186 The targets of the FBI’s anti-gay witch hunts understood this, 
as “[e]mployees were told that failure to answer any questions put to 
them during the inquiry could result in their being fired for failure to 
cooperate.”187 Even in the late twentieth century, some courts held that 
employers could demand that job applicants reveal their sexual 
histories, including sexual orientation.188 These courts reasoned that a 
job applicant’s refusal to answer questions about their sexual 
orientation is sufficient grounds for terminating or refusing to hire an 
employee.189 
 
 183.  See Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 182–83 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also Richardson v. 
Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.D.C. 1972) (reviewing the termination of a postal clerk for 
“refus[ing] to admit or deny that he had engaged in homosexual conduct”); Baker v. Hampton, 
No. 2525-71, 1973 WL 274, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1973) (stating that National Bureau of 
Standards clerical workers were terminated because they “refused to answer inquiries about their 
sexual preferences, practices and associations, claiming such questions were unrelated to job 
performance and were, moreover, invasions of their right to privacy”). 
 184.  Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 645–46 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 185.  Id. at 649. Scott later prevailed because the Commission had not provided him sufficient 
notice of the policy under which he was being penalized. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 126. 
 186.  See BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 175 (“Toward the end it accused me of not furnishing 
the names and identities of those I associated with ‘in what appears to be a secret homosexual 
society.’ The letter said I displayed ‘a lack of candor during the inquiry and a refusal to 
cooperate.’”). 
 187.  Id. at 286. 
 188.  See WINTEMUTE, supra note 148, at 75 (“Refusing to answer the question would not 
seem to be an option. Several courts have interpreted Hardwick as permitting public employers 
or officials to ask, through questionnaires or polygraph tests, whether a person has engaged in 
same-sex sexual activity.”). 
 189.  See, e.g., Walls v. City of St. Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no 
violation of the constitutional right to privacy where a police officer is discharged after refusing 
to answer employer questions about homosexual relations); Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 371 S.E.2d 
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Relatedly, in many cases—at a time when government officials 
automatically denied security clearances to gay people190—
interrogators considered any refusal to refute accusations of 
homosexuality as sufficient to deny individuals any security clearance, 
rendering them ineligible for employment.191 The government has 
routinely asked citizens about their sexual orientation as a prerequisite 
to obtaining a security clearance necessary to pursue one’s career.192  
Third, in some cases, those individuals who refused to cooperate 
with government inquiries into their sexual orientation were 
threatened with public exposure. For example, when Florida state 
officials began their search for lesbian teachers in the state during the 
Cold War, some women refused to answer the most invasive of 
questions.193 These teachers were told that failure to cooperate 
candidly would result in a public hearing in which the target’s sexual 
history would be announced for all to hear.194 This tactic made outright 
refusals to reply quite rare.195  
D.  The Inherent Unfairness of the Gay Perjury Trap 
For decades, millions of gay workers have lived and labored in 
fear. Personal correspondence from the 1960s reveals that many gay 
men worried about the dilemma they faced when seeking employment: 
“be honest . . . about his homosexuality and almost certainly not be 
hired,” or be dishonest and risk being fired when their employer 
discovers the truth.196 Lesbian teachers similarly suffered a double 
bind. A lesbian teacher “loses her job whether she admits her sexual 
 
503, 509 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (same), overruled on other grounds by Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 
S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992). 
 190.  Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1770 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In 1964, 
individuals who were known to be homosexual could not obtain security clearances, and any who 
possessed clearances were likely to lose them if their orientation was discovered.”). 
 191.  See BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 189; Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1375–76 
(C.D. Cal. 1974). 
 192.  See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 580 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
 193.  Braukman, supra note 38, at 566–67. 
 194.  Id. See generally POUCHER, supra note 37 (discussing Florida’s targeting of teachers 
suspected of being gay or lesbian); STACY BRAUKMAN, COMMUNISTS AND PERVERTS UNDER 
THE PALMS: THE JOHNS COMMITTEE IN FLORIDA, 1956-1965 (2012) (same).  
 195.  Braukman, supra note 38, at 567. 
 196.  CRAIG M. LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN COLD WAR 
AMERICA 1–2 (2012). 
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orientation (fired because the bureaucracy fear parental reaction) or 
denies the same (fired because she lied on a bureaucratic form).”197 
Although the historic examples of the gay perjury trap skew towards 
men, the mistreatment of lesbian teachers demonstrates that the trap 
was not limited to gay men.198 
Employers’ anti-gay policies forced LGB employees to lie and to 
remain in the closet. In this way, the gay perjury trap reinforces the 
presumption of an exclusively heterosexual workforce. As Professor 
William N. Eskridge explains, 
A major effect [of state interrogation] was to force or enable people 
to self-identify, to take an affirmative position as to their sexual 
orientation. Where the mask could be silence about one’s sexuality, 
the newly pervasive state questioning precluded silence and put 
homosexuals on the spot. They could affirmatively lie and commit to 
a never-ending masquerade, where one lie led to another and often 
to a life brimming with hypocrisy. Or they could tell the truth and face 
ruin, including jail or an asylum.199 
The gay perjury trap further prevents these individuals from living lives 
of either open and proud proficiency or quiet competence. That is the 
epitome of irrational discrimination. As Part II demonstrates, 
Congress intended Title VII to remedy such invidious discrimination 
in the workplace. But even after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
 197.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 5. 
 198.  The relatively higher number of male examples may be for one or more related reasons. 
First, men were overrepresented in the workforce and in the published reports regarding anti-gay 
employment discrimination. For example, the reported cases challenging the federal 
government’s anti-gay policies were challenged by men who had been fired. See, e.g., Norton v. 
Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reviewing the discharge of a male budget analyst at 
NASA for immoral conduct); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (reviewing the 
disqualification of a male applicant for immoral conduct); Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582, 583 (D.C. 
Cir. 1963) (reviewing the discharge of a male air traffic controller for past homosexual acts). 
Second, many American leaders seemed more concerned with male homosexuality than female 
homosexuality, as indicated by the fact that most vice squads were tasked with detecting and 
arresting gay men, not lesbians. See Christopher R. Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How 
States Use Standing Doctrine To Insulate Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. 
REV. 29, 84 (2001) (“Many police departments employ undercover operations designed to entrap 
gay men into offering or requesting oral sex.”). Regardless of the gender-skewed historical record, 
the lessons of this Article are gender neutral. Unless courts and the EEOC interpret and apply 
Title VII correctly, homophobic employers can use the gay perjury trap against both men and 
women who conceal their sexual orientation. 
 199.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 56.  
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Bostock, the gay perjury trap may interfere with gay workers receiving 
full protection from prejudiced employers.  
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE GAY PERJURY TRAP POST-BOSTOCK  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Bostock opinion, prejudiced 
employers operating in one of the majority of states that failed to 
protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation did not 
have to muster a pretextual excuse for terminating—or refusing to 
hire—LGB workers. They could legally verbalize their intent to 
discriminate. And many did.  
The Supreme Court’s Bostock decision should preclude private 
employers from openly discriminating against gay employees. The 
opinion decided three consolidated cases involving two gay employees 
and one transgender employee who had been fired for their sexual 
orientation and gender identity, respectively.200 In each case, the fired 
employee challenged the termination as violating Title VII.201 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch employed a textualist approach 
to hold that Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination 
“because of” an individual’s sex barred an employer from firing 
employees based on sexual orientation and gender identity.202 
By bringing sexual orientation discrimination within the ambit of 
Title VII, Bostock forces homophobia into the closet. Now, 
homophobic employers will articulate alternative reasons for refusing 
to hire a gay job applicant or for firing a gay employee. In jurisdictions 
where nondiscrimination protections covered sexual orientation, 
employers have historically invoked a litany of pretextual justifications 
for terminating gay employees, from “economic reasons”203 to vague 
references about wanting “to go in a ‘new direction.’”204 To justify their 
firing, businesses have falsely accused gay employees of misuse of 
 
 200.  See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020). 
 201.  Id. at 1738. 
 202.  See id. at 1741. 
 203.  E.g., Portugues Santa v. B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.P.R. 
2006). 
 204.  E.g., Badanish v. Lake Cnty. Gov’t, No. 2:18-CV-351-TLS-APR, 2020 WL 2572516, at 
*1 (N.D. Ind. May 20, 2020). 
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company resources,205 sexual harassment,206 or other alleged 
misconduct.207 
Many of the pretextual arguments invoked by employers are 
premised on factual disputes, such as whether the fired employee was 
insubordinate or had violated a company policy. But one pretextual 
argument had a more solid factual foundation: it is often undisputed 
that an employee has concealed their sexual orientation. If an 
employee’s attempt to pass as heterosexual provides legal grounds for 
termination, then post-Bostock, prejudiced employers could attempt to 
resurrect the same pretextual argument used against, among many 
others, teacher Joseph Acanfora, FBI agent Frank Buttino, and 
government astronomer Frank Kameny. 
Given that the examples discussed in Part I are largely historical 
(though all part of the modern gay rights movement in America), the 
gay perjury trap may appear to have gone dormant. Furthermore, in 
light of Bostock, it might seem unnecessary to revisit the anti-gay 
employment discrimination of the past. This conjecture, however, 
assumes a level of compliance chronically absent in the context of other 
antidiscrimination laws.  
Some might think that the gay perjury trap is no longer relevant 
because most employment in the United States is at-will, which 
generally means that employers can terminate workers without 
reason.208 Although the examples presented involve government jobs 
 
 205.  See, e.g., Rabe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2011) (reviewing a 
lesbian flight attendant’s firing after she was falsely accused of “misusing company-issued travel 
vouchers”). 
 206.  See, e.g., Ceslik v. Miller Ford, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439 (D. Conn. 2008) (discussing 
false claims made that a gay male employee sexually harassed female co-workers); see also Garvey 
v. GMR Mktg., No. 5:16-CV-1072, 2016 WL 11477427, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2016) (“[P]laintiff 
contends that defendant GMR Marketing terminated his employment based on false accusations 
that he offered sexual favors to customers, and that those accusations were pretext for 
discriminating against him based on his sexual orientation.”). 
 207.  See, e.g., Miguel v. Guess, 51 P.3d 89, 98 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing a lesbian 
employee terminated for allegedly “copying and sharing patient records and for being a disruptive 
employee”); Doe v. Casino, 381 F. Supp. 3d 425, 427–28 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (discussing a terminated 
casino card dealer, “claim[ing] that ‘[her employer] used a negative interaction with a customer 
as a pretext to terminate [her] employment, and the real reason . . . was [her] sexual orientation 
(lesbian)’”); Berghorn v. Xerox Corp., No. 3:17-CV-01345-S, 2018 WL 3242276, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 
July 3, 2018) (discussing a gay employee who claimed that a firm used his alleged use of a 
corporate credit card for personal expenses as a pretext for terminating him because of his sexual 
orientation). 
 208.  See Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2015) (“As most 
employees work ‘at will,’ most aspects of their conditions of employment are within the 
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with civil service protections, the gay perjury trap problem also affects 
at-will employees who lack general job protections. These employees 
are protected by Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws, and thus 
cannot be fired for an illegal reason, which after Bostock includes 
sexual orientation and gender identity. Employers can more easily 
conceal their illegal discrimination if they exercise it during the hiring 
process. If there are twenty-four candidates for an advertised position, 
twenty-three of them will not get the job. One of the twenty-three 
might be gay and might not have gotten the job because of the 
employer’s illegal anti-gay discrimination, but it may be difficult for the 
applicant to know and to prove that she did not get the job for a reason 
different than the other twenty-two disappointed applicants. In 
contrast, when an employer fires a current employee, that person alone 
is generally singled out for adverse treatment.209 That singled-out 
employee is more likely to investigate and pursue litigation if evidence 
exists that the firing violated Title VII. Consequently, even private 
employers with an at-will labor force will prefer to exercise their 
unlawful prejudice during the hiring process instead of during 
retention decisions.  
This Part explains why gay employees cannot take complete solace 
in the dormancy of the gay perjury trap. If history is any guide, 
prejudiced employers will evade, thwart, or ignore laws designed to 
defend workers from invidious discrimination. Post-Bostock Title VII 
will likely prove no different. Understanding the discriminatory tactics 
of the past will help to better ensure genuine equality in the future. 
A.  The Perceived Dormancy of the Gay Perjury Trap 
The gay perjury trap might seem an artifact of bygone times. But 
the lack of recent, publicized cases provides cold comfort; most anti-
gay discrimination goes unreported because most victims of the trap do 
not fight back.210 For example, before changing its anti-gay policy, the 
 
employer’s discretion.”); see also Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160, 
1186 (R.I. 2014) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As most employees 
are at-will, the consideration of an employee’s at-will status as a factor weighing against 
discrimination would render the statute meaningless.”). 
 209.  In the context of mass firings—for example, during economic downturns—when many 
employees are fired, it may be harder to identify discrimination absent obvious patterns or 
common characteristics among the group of terminated employees. 
 210.  Amici Curiae Brief of Scholars Who Study the LGB Population in Support of the 
Employees at 19, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618 & 17-1623), 2019 
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FBI threatened gay agents to “‘resign quietly’ or risk being fired,” and 
the agents before Frank Buttino succumbed to the threat.211 Buttino’s 
decision to fight back is the primary reason that we have any insight at 
all into how the FBI treated its gay agents. During his legal battle with 
the agency, Buttino wondered whether it would have been better to 
have resigned, as all the other outed gay agents before him had done.212 
Resignation—not litigation—is the most common response for 
several reasons. First, the graphic questions asked by many employers 
were designed to intimidate and exhaust gay people by “subject[ing 
them] to surveillances, polygraphs, and interrogations regarding the 
most intimate details of their sex lives.”213 Those gay FBI agents who 
resigned under fire stated they had wanted to remain at the agency, but 
the FBI threatened to reinterview friends, family, and neighbors to ask 
about the employees’ homosexual conduct.214 Such threats made quiet 
resignation the only palatable option for every gay agent who preceded 
Buttino. 
Second, those who refused to resign quickly were sometimes 
threatened with prosecution for perjury. This is a literal embodiment 
of the gay perjury trap. Some employers actually ask applicants about 
 
WL 3003461, at *19 (“[C]ountless other acts of employment discrimination across the country go 
unreported given the stigma, embarrassment, and perception that there is no adequate remedy 
on the part of LGB employees.”); see Johnson, Homosexual Citizens, supra note 72, at 54 (“Most 
did remain silent. In the early 1950s, no fired gay or lesbian employee stepped forward to 
challenge his or her dismissal, as publicity would only have compounded the problem.”). 
 211.  As Judge Armstrong described in Buttino v. FBI, 
The declarations evidence the FBI’s extensive inquiries into its gay employees’ private 
sexual activities—including detailed inquiries into specific private sexual acts and the 
exploration of childhood sexuality. The declarations describe the FBI investigators’ 
attempts to obtain the names of other gay employees in the FBI. The declarations 
describe the FBI’s threats that gay employees “resign quietly” or risk being fired. And, 
significantly, at least one of the declarations asserts that the FBI investigators made 
allegations of “lack of candor” by “twisting” the gay employee’s words “at every turn.” 
801 F. Supp. 298, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1992).  
 212.  BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 257 (“I wondered, too, if I should have resigned when all 
this began. Not only were the costs mounting, but I also wanted to get on with my life.”); see also 
id. at 284 (“The files showed that most resigned ‘for personal reasons.’”).  
 213.  Id. at 284; see id. at 145 (“‘It sounds like they’re trying to wear you down so you’ll quit,’ 
he said. ‘That they’ll continue to harass you like this until you eventually resign.’”).  
 214.  Id. at 286 (“The investigation . . . would include interviews with the employees’ parents, 
family, friends, neighbors, and co-workers. The interview would focus on the employee’s 
homosexual conduct. . . . It was the bureau that threatened to expose its employees’ 
homosexuality if they wouldn’t resign.”); id. at 272 (discussing one lesbian FBI agent who “had 
acknowledged her sexual orientation to OPR investigators, and the bureau threatened to 
reinterview her neighbors and friends if she refused to resign”).  
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sexual orientation under oath. For example, FBI investigators 
implicitly threatened Buttino with criminal prosecution for lying under 
oath about sexual orientation.215 
Third, gay individuals who fight discrimination in court often 
transform into public figures, becoming targets of vitriol, hate, and 
further discrimination. For example, Joseph Acanfora’s participation 
in HOPS’ successful lawsuit to be recognized as a valid student group—
coupled with his efforts to secure his Pennsylvania teaching 
credential—exposed him and caused him to lose his teaching job in 
Maryland.216 Acanfora’s endeavors to protect his legal rights ultimately 
cost him his livelihood. Similarly, when Miriam Ben-Shalom 
challenged the military’s anti-gay policy through the late 1970s until 
1990, she became a hero of the gay rights movement.217 But “[e]very 
time a court ruled in her case, she’d had to cope with the negative side 
effects of publicity, including being denied an apartment, being fired 
from a civilian job and receiving anonymous death threats.”218 In 
certifying a class action to challenge the FBI’s anti-gay policy, the 
district court in Buttino observed that “many individual claimants 
would have difficulty filing individual lawsuits out of fear of retaliation, 
exposure, and/or prejudice, such that it is unlikely that individual class 
members would institute separate suits.”219 In short, given this 
dynamic, it is not surprising that most people faced with dismissal for 
lying about their sexual orientation quietly resign and seek other 
employment, leaving it impossible to quantify the number of 
employees (let alone applicants) caught in the gay perjury trap.  
Ultimately, many current victims of anti-gay employment 
discrimination may remain silent because they perceive a lack of legal 
remedies. This provides another important reason for courts and the 
EEOC to ensure that Title VII is interpreted and enforced in a manner 
 
 215.  See id. at 110 (“Fowler said that this was an official administrative inquiry and that there 
was a potential criminal problem if I had lied under oath in the statement I had signed for Hughes 
on October 31.”). 
 216.  See supra notes 120–127 and accompanying text.  
 217.  Julia Diana Robertson, Miriam Ben-Shalom: The Woman Who Fought ‘Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell’, HUFFPOST (last updated July 5, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/miriam-ben-
shalomthe-jewish-woman-that-started-the_b_5952ca6be4b0f078efd985a8 [https://perma.cc/J8VQ-
C6F5]. 
 218.  MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 393. 
 219.  Buttino v. FBI, No. C–90—1639SBA, 1992 WL 12013803, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 
1992). 
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that conceives potential plaintiffs to step forward and document illegal 
discrimination. 
B.  The Ongoing Threat 
Although the case studies in Part I involved uses of the gay perjury 
trap during the early era of the modern gay rights movement, 
employers today continue to ask about job applicants’ and employees’ 
sexual orientation. Major companies—including such behemoths as 
Facebook, AT&T, IBM, JPMorgan Chase, American Express, Wells 
Fargo, and Deutsche Bank—collect data on their employees’ sexual 
orientation.220 American Express has been doing so for over fifteen 
years.221 However, many of these policies are relatively new; for 
example, in 2016, JPMorgan Chase began “asking employees for the 
first time . . . if they’d like to disclose their sexual orientation or gender 
identity.”222 The Human Rights Campaign’s 2020 Corporate Equality 
Index reported that 54 percent of firms invite their employees to 
voluntarily disclose their sexual orientation anonymously.223 But many 
inquiries are not anonymous. In addition to official policies collecting 
information about employees’ sexual orientation, there are several 
contemporary examples of managers and supervisors asking individual 
 
 220.  Jeff Green, Your Boss Wants To Know If You’re Gay, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-08/straight-or-gay-your-boss-wants-to-know-
but-don-t-worry [https://perma.cc/7ZL4-TU5L]. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Self-Identification of LGBTQ Employees, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., 
https://www.hrc.org/resources/self-identification-of-lgbt-employees [https://perma.cc/X97N-
UMKM]. 
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employees whether they are gay, including in retail environments,224 
banks,225 and regional hospitals.226 
Although some employers ask about sexual orientation to be 
responsive and sensitive to the needs of their workforce, employees 
continue to be terminated for lying about their homosexual 
relationships.227 Furthermore, although the origin and historical 
examples of the perjury trap lie in discrimination against gay men, a 
version of the trap has recently been used against a transgender job 
candidate. In Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc.,228 
an employer rescinded its job offer to a transgender woman.229 The 
employer asserted that it was not discriminating based on the 
applicant’s transgender status but because she had “lied during the 
interview process, and that it was her failure to affirmatively reveal her 
status as biologically male that led to the decision to rescind the job 
offer.”230 The court did not embrace the employer’s 
“misrepresentation” argument, but this was in part because the 
employer did not actually ask the applicant “to reveal her sex, either 
orally or on . . . application and hiring forms.”231 The court thus reached 
the correct result, but it did so through reasoning that is easily 
 
 224.  See, e.g., Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC, No. 1:19-cv-08423-GHW, 2020 WL 3100256, 
at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020) (discussing an apparel company supervisor repeatedly asking 
their male employee whether a client was their boyfriend); Troutman v. Hydro Extrusion USA, 
LLC, 388 F. Supp. 3d 400, 401 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (discussing a senior extruder getting asked if he 
was gay shortly after beginning his position, and being subject to sexual harassment by his 
coworkers and managers as a result); Helmer Friedman LLP, Helmer Friedman Files Suit Against 
Trader Joe’s for Alleged Sexual Orientation Discrimination, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 20, 
2016, 2:27AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/helmer-friedman-files-suit-against-
trader-joes-for-alleged-sexual-orientation-discrimination-300331189.html 
[https://perma.cc/FFV8-697T] (alleging that the grocery chain Trader Joe’s fired a store manager 
due to their sexual orientation). 
 225. See, e.g., Slay v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. CA 10–408 ML, 2011 WL 1045629, at *1 (D.R.I. 
Mar. 9, 2011) (discussing allegations that Bank of America’s new hire questionnaire included 
questions about sexual orientation), adopting recommendations No. CA 10–408 ML, 2011 WL 
938309 (D.R.I. Mar. 16, 2011). 
 226.  See, e.g., Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussing 
allegations that a hospital human resources manager asked the plaintiff about their sexuality). 
 227.  See, e.g., City of Neodesha v. BP Corp. N. Am., 50 Kan. App. 2d 731, 774–75 (Ct. App. 
2014) (“Lord Browne was terminated after the London newspapers reported that he had a 
homosexual affair. Browne was reportedly terminated by the board for lying about the 
relationship.”). 
 228.  Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 
2008). 
 229.  Id. at 656.  
 230.  Id. at 663. 
 231.  Id. 
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circumvented if the employer asks direct questions, as the government 
historically did regarding sexual orientation. 
The Lopez case illustrates two points. First, present-day 
employers are using perjury traps to justify anti-LGBT discrimination. 
Second, the lessons from the gay perjury trap should inform judges how 
to respond to other types of discrimination, including against 
transgender employees and job candidates.  
The dearth of modern court opinions documenting the gay perjury 
trap may reflect a self-selection issue. Those states that voluntarily 
enacted antidiscrimination laws extending to sexual orientation are 
relatively liberal states with relatively liberal employers. In contrast, 
those states that successfully resisted such protections pre-Bostock are 
relatively conservative, as are many of the business owners in those 
states, which is why the employers in the Bostock cases felt 
emboldened to openly terminate employees for their sexual 
orientation. Those conservative states—the ones most affected by the 
Bostock decision—are most likely to harbor employers who will deploy 
the gay perjury trap to discriminate against gay workers, especially now 
that open discrimination violates federal law. 
In addition, in the post-Bostock era, employers may refashion the 
gay perjury trap as an issue of religious liberty. Modern churches have 
employed the classic trap to justify terminating employees who lied to 
conceal their homosexuality. In Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc.,232 
church leaders justified firing their director by emphasizing that he 
“had been asked 40 or 50 times if he were gay and had lied and said 
that he was not.”233 But Bostock leaves room for more creative 
maneuvers. Unfortunately, Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bostock 
signaled approval of anti-LGBT discrimination by employers claiming 
that their religious beliefs include homophobia.234 If the Supreme 
Court creates a broad religious exemption to Title VII’s protection of 
LGBT employees, homophobic employers will likely wave the flag of 
religion to justify their inquiries into sexual orientation and 
mistreatment of gay employees and job candidates.235  
 
 232.  Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 233.  Id. at 3. 
 234.  See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020). 
 235.  Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682, 690 (2014) (evaluating the defense 
presented by the corporation invoking religious freedom to evade contraceptive mandate). 
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C.  The Need for Vigilance in the Post-Bostock Era 
One can hope that the Bostock opinion will consign these uses of 
the gay perjury trap to legal history books. But even with 
nondiscrimination policies in place, the gay perjury trap remains an 
ever-present threat in many occupations, such as law enforcement, “a 
profession in which you may not necessarily be fired for being gay, but 
you will absolutely be fired for lying.”236 Supervisors eager to fire gay 
employees are willing to invoke the most convenient excuse for 
termination. In many local police departments, “a homophobic police 
chief or sheriff” would find it “much easier and accepted as proper and 
ethical to fire a gay officer for lying than . . . for simply being gay.”237 In 
many occupations and localities, gay workers will continue to worry 
that their discretion could be penalized as dishonesty.  
The Bostock opinion is a promising and welcome development on 
the road to legal equality for LGBT Americans. Unfortunately, 
however, the passage of antidiscrimination laws does not eliminate 
discrimination. The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not 
eradicate racial discrimination. Despite the presence of Title VII, 
gender discrimination persists. These laws, however, have not been 
failures. They have reduced discrimination and have provided a means 
of compensation for victims of illegal discrimination. 
Bostock, too, will not end employment discrimination against 
LGBT workers. The intense hatred directed against gay people in 
America is too deep and fervent to be eliminated simply by a judicial 
act of statutory interpretation. Although many employers who would 
otherwise discriminate against gay workers will stop doing so to comply 
with the law, others will attempt to skirt it. 
To determine how anti-gay employers may attempt to circumvent 
Title VII—or simply violate the law without being held accountable—
it is instructive to recall how employers in the pre-Bostock era 
successfully flouted general job protections that sheltered gay 
employees and job applicants from arbitrary discrimination. After 
Bostock, Title VII prohibits an employer from firing workers based on 
sexual orientation. Employers wishing to remove LGBT employees 
from their workforce may look for another justification for terminating 
these workers. In a post-Bostock workplace, employers may justify 
 
 236.  GREG MIRAGLIA, AMERICAN HEROES COMING OUT FROM BEHIND THE BADGE: 
STORIES FROM POLICE, FIRE, AND EMS PROFESSIONALS OUT ON THE JOB 173 (2010).  
 237.  Id. at 173–74.  
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2021  4:16 PM 
46  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1 
firing a gay employee by claiming that the termination was based on 
the employee’s prior dishonesty regarding their sexual orientation. If 
future courts follow the Acanfora opinion’s reasoning, these employers 
may be able to circumvent Title VII as applied to gay employees. Thus, 
if employers can ask about sexual orientation during the application 
process through direct and indirect questions, they can still set the trap. 
If a gay job applicant acknowledges their sexual orientation during 
the interview process, the employer may later politely inform the 
applicant that the position was filled by someone else. The main 
difference after Bostock is that the employer cannot announce its anti-
gay policy. In the past, the FBI, police departments, and private 
employers felt no shame in telling gay applicants to their faces: we 
“do[] not hire second-class citizens.”238 After Bostock, such statements 
invite liability. While abhorrent, the anti-gay policies of the pre-
Bostock era were at least often transparent. By driving discrimination 
underground, Bostock may make it more difficult for gay applicants to 
prove discrimination under Title VII.  
If gay applicants successfully conceal their sexual orientation, they 
may get the job. But they will work in fear, as Buttino, Acanfora, 
Kameny, and others in the pre-Bostock era did. Because the law 
generally permits employers to terminate employees for lying during 
the application process,239 once the employee’s sexual orientation is 
revealed, their job is potentially in jeopardy. The employer can claim 
that it is not terminating the gay employee due to their sexual 
orientation—now an illegal basis for termination—but rather because 
of the employee’s fraud during the application process—a seemingly 
legitimate reason for termination. 
If courts allow employers to utilize the gay perjury trap post-
Bostock, the Supreme Court victory will prove pyrrhic. Prejudiced 
employers would be able to rid their workforces of openly gay 
employees. Detected gay workers will be rejected or terminated. 
Undetected gay employees will toil in quiet desperation, vulnerable 
and fearful that any misrepresentation of their sexual orientation made 
during their application process could result in their immediate 
termination. Part III explores how courts should interpret Title VII to 
prevent employers from circumventing Bostock through deployment 
of a gay perjury trap.  
 
 238.  BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 289. 
 239.  See infra notes 332–33 and accompanying text. 
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2021  4:16 PM 
2021] THE GAY PERJURY TRAP 47 
III. DISMANTLING THE GAY PERJURY TRAP 
Bostock holds the promise of reducing discrimination against gay 
workers if courts properly interpret Title VII moving forward. For 
Bostock to be effective, courts must disable the gay perjury trap. Part I 
explained how the trap has three components. First, the employer asks 
about sexual orientation—directly or indirectly—and either refuses to 
hire or fires gay workers who truthfully reveal their sexual orientation. 
Second, if gay employees conceal their sexual orientation to get and 
retain a job and their sexual orientation is later discovered, then they 
are fired for their earlier dishonesty. Third, the employer declines to 
hire applicants who attempt to evade the gay perjury trap by refusing 
to answer questions about their sexual orientation. This Part argues 
that courts should interpret Title VII in a manner that dismantles each 
of these steps. 
A.  Prohibiting Employer Inquiries into Sexual Orientation 
If an employer inquires about an employee’s sexual orientation 
and, after learning that an employee is LGB, takes adverse action 
against that employee, this alone should create a presumption of illegal 
discrimination. Of course, the employer can rebut this presumption by 
presenting evidence that the adverse job action had nothing to do with 
the employee’s sexual orientation. This section explains why inquiries 
into sexual orientation are sufficient—but not necessary—to create a 
presumption of illegal discrimination.  
1. Prohibitions on Employer Inquiries into Protected Categories.  
Inquiries about a job applicant’s race, religion, sex, or national origin 
are not generally considered to be per se violations of Title VII.240 
Nevertheless, the EEOC cautions employers against asking these 
 
 240.  See 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 12.04 (2021) 
[hereinafter LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION] (“Traditionally, pre-employment 
inquiries as to race, color, religion, sex, and national origin have been frowned upon under civil 
rights laws. . . . It is important to understand, however, that inquiries per se are not among the 
discriminatory employment actions explicitly banned by Title VII . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). But 
see Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (mentioning that 
the Eighth Circuit has considered questions about an applicant’s marriage and child plans to be 
“a per se violation of Title VII”). 
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questions.241 Such a query appears discriminatory.242 Questions about 
an employee’s protected status are generally considered evidence in 
discrimination cases because such inquiries are “suspected of laying the 
groundwork for illegal discrimination.”243 An employer’s ignorance 
about an applicant’s protected characteristics ultimately protects the 
employer.244  
Such inquiries are not per se illegal under federal law because the 
questions can serve a legitimate function. For example, employers may 
ask about race, religion, or gender to comply with EEOC 
recordkeeping requirements or to implement a legal affirmative action 
program.245 Also, inquiries into gender may be permitted when the 
 
 241.  See Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 382 (1997) (“[T]he EEOC Guide 
cautions against the use of questions that directly inquire about protected class status such [as] 
date of birth, religion and national origin.”).  
 242.  Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Pre-employment 
questioning concerning the applicant’s national origin, race or citizenship exposes the employer 
to charges of discrimination if he does not hire that applicant.”).  
 243.  1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 9.02 (2020) (“[E]mployer inquiries are 
relevant primarily as evidence that some other action, such as a refusal to hire, was undertaken 
with discriminatory intent.”); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FACTS ABOUT 
RACE/COLOR DISCRIMINATION (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/W7V6-3F4P] (“[I]f members of minority groups are excluded from 
employment, the request for such pre-employment information [regarding applicant’s race] 
would likely constitute evidence of discrimination.”); see also Ian Byrnside, Note, Six Clicks of 
Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites To Research 
Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 463 (2008) (“Although questions regarding [race, 
color, religion and other statuses] are not necessarily illegal, employers generally avoid asking 
them because they typically have ‘no legitimate, job-related reason for asking them, and they are 
suggestive of unlawful discriminatory motives.’”). 
 244.  See Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as 
Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 99, 100 (2007) (“[E]mployment law utilizes ignorance as a means of achieving fairness 
by blocking access to information that would otherwise enable employers to make discriminatory 
hiring decisions.”). 
 245.  To comply with federal regulations,  
Each user should maintain and have available for inspection records or other 
information which will disclose the impact which its tests and other selection 
procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by identifiable race, sex, 
or ethnic group as set forth in paragraph B of this section, in order to determine 
compliance with these guidelines. 
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2020); see also FREDERICK T. GOLDER & DAVID R. GOLDER, LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 4:218 (3d ed. 2021) (“The EEOC 
recognizes an exception for preemployment inquiries regarding race, color, religion, and national 
origin when made for the purpose of complying with federal, state, or local equal employment 
agencies.”); LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 240 (“The EEOC requires 
extensive recordkeeping as to the race, color, religion, sex, and national origin of an employer’s 
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question addresses a bona fide occupational qualification 
(“BFOQ”).246  
In addition to federal protections, state laws also condemn many 
forms of employment discrimination. Some state laws restrict pre-
employment inquiries more than federal law does.247 Others explicitly 
prohibit certain pre-employment inquiries into various protected 
statuses, including sexual orientation.248 While other state statutes do 
not prohibit such inquiries outright, their state commissions “advise 
employers that it may be unlawful to inquire into these aspects of an 
applicant.”249  
Mirroring federal law, some states tether the legality of the inquiry 
to the presence of a BFOQ.250 Sexual orientation, however, is not a 
 
work force, including applicant data. Furthermore, the EEOC and the courts have endorsed 
voluntary affirmative action on the part of private employers.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 246.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2020) (“Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with 
prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or 
discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational 
qualification.”). The EEOC advises,  
Questions about an applicant’s sex, (unless it is a bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ) and is essential to a particular position or occupation), marital status, 
pregnancy, medical history of pregnancy, future child bearing plans, number and/or 
ages of children or dependents, provisions for child care, abortions, birth control, 
ability to reproduce, and name or address of spouse or children are generally viewed 
as non job-related and problematic under Title VII. 
Pre-Employment Inquiries and Gender, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_gender.cfm [https://perma.cc/X9Y5-ENNS]. 
 247.  See Befort, supra note 241, at 386 (“The statutes of many states also limit pre-
employment inquiries relating to protected class status and some do so in a manner more 
restrictive than federal law. . . . To the extent that these state laws provide the same or greater 
protection against discrimination, they are not preempted by federal law.” (footnote omitted)).  
 248.  Schoenbaum, supra note 244, at 103. For example, Maine’s Human Rights Act makes it 
unlawful for an employer prior to employment to “[e]licit or attempt to elicit information directly 
or indirectly pertaining to race or color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, 
religion, age, ancestry or national origin . . . .” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (2020).  
 249.  Schoenbaum, supra note 244, at 103. 
 250.  For example, Minnesota’s statute provides that pre-employment,  
[e]xcept when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair 
employment practice for an employer . . . to: (1) require or request the person to furnish 
information that pertains to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital 
status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, sexual orientation, or age.  
MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2020). Similarly, Pennsylvania law provides:  
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide 
occupational qualification . . . [f]or any employer . . . to: (1) Elicit any information or 
make or keep a record of or use any form of application or application blank containing 
questions or entries concerning the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, 
national origin . . . . 
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BFOQ for any occupation.251 For example, asserting customers may 
not like gay people is not a BFOQ.252 Sexual orientation is not 
indicative of analytical abilities, physical strength, or any other job-
related quality.253 The inquiry into sexual orientation is therefore 
inherently suspect and should be presumptively illegal. 
Post-Bostock courts should condemn inquiries into sexual 
orientation even though Title VII does not make it per se illegal to ask 
applicants about their racial background (or other protected 
characteristics). Inquiries about race are permitted to comply with 
EEOC recordkeeping requirements or to implement a legal 
affirmative action program. But neither rationale is relevant to sexual 
orientation. Therefore, the justifications for allowing questions about 
race do not apply to questions about sexual orientation. At a minimum, 
EEOC guidance should be revised to state that inquiries regarding 
sexual orientation are evidence of intent to discriminate. Alternatively, 
the EEOC could follow state approaches and treat such inquiries as 
per se Title VII violations. 
2. Privacy Rights.  Interpreting Title VII as precluding inquiries 
into sexual orientation is consistent with protecting job applicants and 
employees. Though the constitutional right to privacy is generally 
thought of as a right of autonomy, it includes a right to nondisclosure 
in some contexts. In Whalen v. Roe,254 the Supreme Court recognized a 
 
43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 2020); see also W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016) 
(outlawing inquiries as to an applicant’s “race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex or 
age” except when based upon a BFOQ).  
 251.  See Kate B. Rhodes, Defending ENDA: The Ramifications of Omitting the BFOQ 
Defense in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 19 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 7–8 (2010) 
(“ENDA, as it was last introduced and passed, did not contain a BFOQ defense. . . . Without a 
BFOQ, ENDA will never allow or entertain that someone’s sexual orientation may be a job 
requirement or necessity.”).  
 252.  See 804 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01 (2020) (“A mere customer or coworker preference is 
not a BFOQ, e.g., ‘customers prefer to deal with people of the same race’ or ‘employees are 
uncomfortable working with people of different sexual orientation.’”); cf. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil 
Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1274, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the assertion that “Latin American 
clients would react negatively to a woman vice president” is not a legitimate reason for 
considering gender as a bona fide occupational qualification). 
 253.  Some may argue that religious organizations have a BFOQ in discriminating against gay 
employees. That issue is beyond the scope of this Article but warrants serious attention.  
 254.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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privacy right in nondisclosure of sensitive facts,255 while upholding a 
New York statute that required doctors to provide copies of 
prescriptions written for particular drugs to the state.256 Although the 
Court deemed the right uninfringed on the facts before it, it 
nonetheless held that a constitutional privacy right to nondisclosure 
exists.257 Federal courts have embraced and expanded Whalen, holding 
that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the nondisclosure 
of certain medical information,258 including prescription drug 
records,259 psychiatric records,260 and AIDS status.261 Courts have also 
extended Whalen beyond medical information to include financial 
information.262  
These privacy rights also extend to employees’ interests in 
nondisclosure of personal information. For example, in Shuman v. City 
of Philadelphia,263 the plaintiff’s employment with a police department 
was conditioned on him answering questions about his alleged 
participation in an extramarital heterosexual affair.264 The court held 
that “a party’s private sexual activities are within the ‘zone of privacy’ 
protected from unwarranted government intrusion.”265 Consequently, 
 
 255.  Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“The Court recognizes that an 
individual’s ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’ is an aspect of the right of 
privacy . . . .”).  
 256.  Id. at 593, 600 (majority opinion).  
 257.  See State v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1216 (La. 2009) (noting that Whalen recognized that 
the right to privacy includes “the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); 
see also E. Lauren Arnault, Status, Conduct, and Forced Disclosure: What Does Bowers v. 
Hardwick Really Say?, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 757, 768 (2003) (“In Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services, decided just four months after Whalen, the Court acknowledged a 
complimentary [sic] right to privacy with respect to dissemination of personal information.”).  
 258.  See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577–80 (3d Cir. 1980); see 
also Arnault, supra note 257, at 769 (“Following Whalen, courts have continued to expand the 
protection of personal medical records, solidifying a constitutional right to privacy of medical 
records.”). 
 259.  See Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 260.  See Haw. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Haw. 1979).  
 261.  See Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990). 
 262.  See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558–59 (2d Cir. 1983) (endorsing an 
approach that weighs the individual’s privacy interest against the state’s interest in seeking the 
disclosure of the individual’s financial information); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. 
REV. 553, 560–61 (1995) (“A limitless sharing of information about such topics as one’s medical 
history, sexual behavior, or financial affairs raises a threat to . . . self-determination.”). 
 263.  Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
 264.  Id. at 453. 
 265.  Id. at 459. 
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the court ruled that the police department’s policy of requiring 
employees to answer all questions about their private sex lives “even 
though the questions have no bearing upon an officer’s job 
performance, is unconstitutional.”266 While Shuman involved public 
employers, courts have extended the principle to private employers.267 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has explained that “in the area of 
private employment there may be inquiries of a personal nature that 
are unreasonably intrusive and no business of the employer and that 
an employee may not be discharged with impunity for failure to answer 
such requests.”268 
This jurisprudence raises the issue of whether sexual orientation 
is included within these nondisclosure rights. Initially, some federal 
courts declined to protect information regarding sexual orientation. 
For example, in Truesdale v. University of North Carolina,269 a North 
Carolina court held that an employer could require job applicants and 
employees to answer questions about “homosexual activity” and 
“unusual or unnatural sex acts”270 because, under Bowers v. 
Hardwick,271 “[t]here is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
activity.”272 Similarly, in Walls v. City of Petersburg,273 the Fourth 
Circuit held that a city could terminate an employee for refusing to 
answer questions about her sexual orientation.274 The court reasoned 
that “because the Bowers decision is controlling, we hold that [a 
question asking an employee whether she has ‘ever had sexual 
relations with a person of the same sex’] does not ask for information 
that [the employee] has a right to keep private.”275  
 
 266.  Id. at 461. 
 267.  See Bratt v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Mass. 1984) (“In evaluating 
whether the information sought from employees could amount to an unreasonable interference 
with their right of privacy, we stated that the employer’s legitimate interest in determining the 
employees’ effectiveness in their jobs should be balanced against the seriousness of the intrusion 
on the employees’ privacy.”). 
 268.  Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 912 n.9 (Mass. 1982). 
 269.  Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 371 S.E.2d 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
 270.  Id. at 509. 
 271.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 272.  Truesdale, 371 S.E.2d at 509 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. 186). 
 273.  Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 274.  Id. at 193; see Arnault, supra note 257, at 783 (criticizing Walls because “[d]ue to the 
administrative nature of Walls’s job, the state interest was relatively low. Thus, Walls should have 
received privacy protection in this instance.” (footnote omitted)).  
 275.  Walls, 895 F.2d at 193; see also Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 988 (D.S.C. 1997) 
(interpreting Walls to hold that “no privacy interest was involved with respect to whether the 
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This line of cases is not controlling today. Even when Bowers was 
good law, some courts held that Bowers was not decisive on the issue 
of informational privacy. In Sterling v. Borough of Minersville,276 the 
Third Circuit held that “sexual orientation [is] an intimate aspect of 
[one’s] personality entitled to privacy protection under Whalen. The 
Supreme Court, despite the Bowers decision, and our court have 
clearly spoken that matters of personal intimacy are safeguarded 
against unwarranted disclosure.”277 The Third Circuit has explained 
that information regarding “one’s sexual orientation . . . is intrinsically 
private”278 and falls into the protection of the right to informational 
privacy.279 
Most significantly, the legal landscape changed dramatically in 
2003 when the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas.280 In 
Lawrence, the Court explicitly overruled Bowers and recognized a 
substantive privacy right for consenting adults to engage in same-sex 
sexual activities.281 This suggests that cases like Shuman, which protect 
heterosexual privacy,282 now also protect homosexual privacy. With 
Bowers repudiated, the foundation of the Truesdale and Walls opinions 
has been eliminated.283 After Lawrence, even the narrow reading of 
Whalen advanced by Truesdale and Walls protects against coerced 
disclosure of sexual orientation, because homosexual conduct is now 
covered by the autonomy branch of the constitutional right of privacy. 
The Bostock opinion strengthens the constitutional case against 
allowing employer inquiries into sexual orientation. Before Bostock, 
some courts held that when an employer could “lawfully have 
discharged [an employee] on the basis of her sexual preference, when 
allegations surface[] about [an employee’s] sexual preference [the 
 
plaintiff had engaged in homosexual relations”), aff’d, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 
141 (2000); Dawson v. State Law Enf’t Div., No. 3:91–1403–17, 1992 WL 208967, at *5 (D.S.C. 
Apr. 6, 1992) (interpreting Shuman as “recogniz[ing] that some portions of a public official’s 
private sexual life may be within the zone of protected privacy, but it in no way states that the 
constitutional right of privacy extends to sexual conduct committed between two males”). 
 276.  Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 277.  Id. at 196. 
 278.  Id. at 196 n.4. 
 279.  See id. at 194 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)).  
 280.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 281.  Id. at 578. 
 282.  See supra notes 263–268 and accompanying text.  
 283.  See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text. 
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employer has] a right to question her about it.”284 Consequently, this 
reasoning goes, the employee’s privacy rights are not infringed.285 
Similarly, older opinions held that government agencies could inquire 
into a job applicant’s sexual orientation because it was legal to deny 
security clearances to gay people.286 Now that it is no longer legal to 
condition either employment or security clearances on heterosexuality, 
the inquiry into an applicant’s sexual orientation serves no legal 
purpose. By bringing sexual orientation discrimination within the 
ambit of Title VII, Bostock reinforces the position that employers 
violate job applicants' and employees’ constitutional rights to privacy 
when interviewers pry into sexual orientation.  
The right to not disclose personal information, however, is not 
absolute.287 To determine whether collecting or disseminating 
information violates the constitutional right to nondisclosure, courts 
must balance “the state’s interests in disclosure . . . against the privacy 
needs of the individual.”288 There may be legitimate reasons to inquire 
into employees’ off-duty sexual relations. For example, a police 
department, in its role as employer, may investigate an employee’s off-
duty sexual activities for various reasons, such as when there are claims 
that an officer has committed sexual assault,289 is sleeping with a 
mobster’s wife,290 or is in a relationship with a subordinate.291  
 
 284.  Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1172 (Mass. 1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  
 285.  Id. 
 286.  See Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1376–77 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
 287.  Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 288.  Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The Shuman court 
explained, 
In the area of privacy, the hesitation to compel disclosure may rest upon different 
grounds. If there is a constitutionally protected “zone-of-privacy”, compelled 
disclosure in and of itself may be an invasion of that zone, and therefore, a violation of 
protected rights. Absent a strong countervailing state interest, disclosure of private 
matters should not be compelled. 
Id. 
 289.  See State Trooper Fraternal Ass’n v. New Jersey, No. 08–3820, 2008 WL 4378343, at *6–
7 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2008) (explaining that the officer’s assertion that sexual conduct was 
consensual does not make further inquiry into the incident an unconstitutional invasion of 
privacy). 
 290.  See Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796, 798–800 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 779 F.2d 36 (2d 
Cir. 1985). 
 291.  See, e.g., Puzick v. City of Colorado Springs, 680 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Colo. App. 1983) 
(upholding a male sergeant’s suspension for off-duty sexual relations with a probationary 
policewoman); see also Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 895 F. Supp. 375, 385 (D. Mass. 1995) 
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2021  4:16 PM 
2021] THE GAY PERJURY TRAP 55 
Employers must have a legitimate reason to inquire into 
applicants’ and employees’ sexual orientation. As the Third Circuit 
noted in Sterling, “[i]f there is a government interest in disclosing or 
uncovering one’s sexuality that is ‘genuine, legitimate and compelling,’ 
then this legitimate interest can override the protections of the right to 
privacy.”292 The balance, however, weighs heavily against disclosure 
because “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more private matter than one’s 
sexuality and a less likely probability that the government would have 
a legitimate interest in disclosure of sexual identity.”293 
The Supreme Court’s Bostock decision makes the right-to-privacy 
argument against coerced disclosure of sexual orientation even more 
compelling because the balance in favor of privacy rights becomes 
stronger as the employer’s interest in uncovering the private 
information becomes less convincing. The employer must show a 
legitimate need to know an applicant’s sexual orientation. Bostock 
should make it harder for employers to argue that they have a 
legitimate interest in discovering the sexual orientation of applicants 
and employees, because a federal statute now provides that sexual 
orientation cannot be the basis for employment decisions. Before 
Bostock, courts held that an employee’s privacy rights trump an 
employer’s desire to know about “off-duty personal activities” unless 
they “have an impact upon his on-the-job performance.”294 Bostock is 
 
(noting that the police chief’s “liberty interest in his private sexual activities and fantasies which 
are constitutionally protected against unwarranted government intrusion and disclosure . . . must 
be balanced against the town’s justifiable concerns about [his] effectiveness as a police chief, his 
trustworthiness as custodian of prisoners, and his susceptibility to blackmail”), aff’d, 81 F.3d 257 
(1st Cir. 1996). 
 292.  Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196 (quoting Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1141 (3d. 
Cir. 1995)). As the Ninth Circuit explained,  
The City must show that its inquiry into appellant’s sex life was justified by the 
legitimate interests of the police department, that the inquiry was narrowly tailored to 
meet those legitimate interests, and that the department’s use of the information it 
obtained about appellant’s sexual history was proper in light of the state’s interests. 
Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 293.  Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196; cf. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(“The more intimate or personal the information, the more justified is the expectation that it will 
not be subject to public scrutiny.”). 
 294.  Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also State 
Trooper Fraternal Ass’n, 2008 WL 4378343, at *6 (“[W]hen a police officer’s private sexual 
conduct adversely affects job performance, a police department may investigate and regulate that 
conduct.”); Sylvester v. Fogley, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1140 (W.D. Ark. 2005) (“In the absence of 
a nexus between private activity and poor job performance, investigation into private affairs is 
unconstitutional. Where an officer’s private life affects his job performance, a police agency may 
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based on the premise that sexual orientation has no relationship to job 
performance and therefore strengthens the argument that the 
employer’s desire to know does not outweigh the employee’s privacy 
right in nondisclosure.295  
 
3. Indirect Questions.  Employers intent on discriminating against 
gay workers may attempt to circumvent any prohibition on direct 
questions regarding sexual orientation by inquiring indirectly. As 
explained in Part I, employers historically asked about arrest records 
and organizational memberships.  
The arrest records issue might appear superseded for two reasons: 
First, states can no longer criminalize private, same-sex conduct.296 
And, second, many states have enacted “ban-the-box” laws prohibiting 
employers from asking job candidates about their criminal records in 
initial job applications.297  
Although these improvements represent progress, the underlying 
problem remains. First, many gay job candidates have arrest records or 
convictions for private, consensual sex in the pre-Lawrence era. These 
people deserve protection from the gay perjury trap. Furthermore, 
despite the Lawrence opinion’s invalidation of state sodomy laws, 
many local police departments still conduct stings and mass arrests of 
men suspected of being gay.298 These police raids are likely 
unconstitutional, but they nonetheless create arrest records for the 
 
inquire into that distinct, job-related portion of the officer’s private affairs.” (citations omitted)), 
aff’d, 465 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 295.  See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (“An individual’s 
homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.”). 
 296.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Leslie, Perfect Storm, supra note 44, at 
526–31 (explaining how the Lawrence Court’s substantive due process approach eliminated 
sodomy laws in a way that an equal protection approach would not have).  
 297.  U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON 
THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS 
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 n.101 (2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/2T5L-SCCW]. Some 
states have distinguished between arrests and convictions in their ban-the-box laws. See, e.g., King 
v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312–13 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“In Pennsylvania, 
employers are allowed to consider an applicant’s felony and misdemeanor convictions, but not 
mere arrests, in connection with hiring decisions.”). 
 298.  See, e.g., J. Kelly Strader & Lindsey Hay, Lewd Stings: Extending Lawrence v. Texas to 
Discriminatory Enforcement, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 465, 465–66 (2019) (documenting the use of 
a police sting against gay men in Palm Springs in 2010). 
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innocent gay men who are targeted. Those records could prompt 
employment discrimination if employers can inquire about arrests and 
their circumstances.299  
Second, ban-the-box laws do not solve the problem of arrest 
records being used as part of a gay perjury trap. These laws are 
necessary; empirical studies show that checking the box on an 
employment application drastically reduces an applicant’s likelihood 
of receiving a call back.300 Further, these effects are highly racialized, 
with Black applicants in particular enduring discrimination.301 
Unfortunately, however, many employers can continue to misuse 
arrest records. First, although two-thirds of states have ban-the-box 
laws, one-third do not.302 Also, some such laws apply to only a subset 
of employers.303 Most importantly, these laws prohibit questions about 
applicants’ criminal records on initial applications, but they allow these 
inquiries later in the application process.304  
Appreciating the history of the gay perjury trap can inform 
ongoing legislative debates. The use of arrest records in the gay perjury 
 
 299.  Furthermore, independent of homophobia, the mere fact of being arrested could render 
an otherwise qualified gay applicant ineligible for employment, even though the arrest was for 
constitutionally protected conduct. See Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something To 
Talk About: Information Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 88 (2016) 
(“Advocates for . . . ban-the-box laws are concerned that employers will automatically throw out 
applications that check the wrong box . . . without any further consideration.”). 
 300.  See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 937, 958–59 (2003) 
(“While the ratio of callbacks for nonoffenders relative to ex-offenders for whites is 2:1, this same 
ratio for blacks is nearly 3:1.”).  
 301.  Id. at 957–59; Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender 
Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 951 (2014) 
(“The unfettered access to arrest and conviction data currently enjoyed by employers perpetuates 
bias, stigma, and discrimination against people with criminal records and widens racial 
disparities.”). 
 302.  See BETH AVERY & HAN LU, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, BAN THE BOX 2 (2020), 
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-
Oct-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHJ6-P52Q] (“Nationwide, 36 states and over 150 cities and 
counties have adopted what is widely known as ‘ban the box’ so that employers consider a job 
candidate’s qualifications first—without the stigma of a conviction or arrest record.”). 
 303.  Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact 
and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 
216 (2014) (“Moreover, even in locations where ban the box policies are in effect, for the most 
part they cover only a subset of employers.”).  
 304.  See Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1459 (2014) (“[M]ost of the new ban the box measures merely prohibit 
employers from asking about convictions on an initial application form, [but] . . . employers are 
free to inquire at later stages.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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trap provides yet another reason for those holdout state legislatures to 
enact ban-the-box laws and for all states to ensure that their ban-the-
box statutes are sufficiently broad to protect the civil rights of all 
minorities. 
Although it may seem harder to prevent employers from inquiring 
about organizational memberships as a proxy for sexual orientation, 
EEOC guidelines already discourage inquiries into organizations that 
“indicate the applicant’s race, sex,” or other protected status.305 In a 
similar spirit, the EEOC should permit job applicants to omit 
references to clubs or organizations that would implicitly disclose the 
applicants’ sexual orientation. 
In addition to the inquiries discussed in Part I, the recent legal 
recognition of same-sex marriages provides employers an additional 
avenue for asking about sexual orientation. Family structures are 
different now than when Frank Kameny and Joseph Acanfora were 
fired from their jobs. Instead of asking about arrests and memberships, 
curious interviewers today are more likely to ask seemingly innocent 
questions about the applicant’s family life. An honest answer may 
reveal the applicant’s sexual orientation.  
Indeed, same-sex marriage has proved a double-edged sword for 
some. In the wake of marriage equality, some employers use inquiries 
into marriage and emergency contacts to uncover the sexual 
orientation of applicants and employees.306 Before Bostock, in states 
without LGBT-inclusive nondiscrimination laws, gay employees could 
get married on a weekend and then be fired for their sexual orientation 
upon returning to work on the following Monday.307 Bostock should 
 
 305.  THOMSON REUTERS ED. STAFF, 1 CHECKLISTS FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL § 1:65 (Apr. 
2021 ed. 2021) (“Inquiries about organizations, clubs, societies, and lodges of which an applicant 
may be a member or any other questions, which may indicate the applicant’s race, sex, national 
origin, disability status, age, religion, color or ancestry if answered, should generally be 
avoided.”).  
 306.  See, e.g., Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., No. NOCV2014–751, 2015 WL 9682042, at *1 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2015) (evaluating the termination of a new employee after he listed his 
husband as his emergency contact). While a firm can collect information about a same-sex spouse 
on an insurance policy, the firm cannot misuse that information. An employer telling others that 
an employee has listed a same-sex partner as an insurance beneficiary could constitute the tort of 
invasion of privacy. See Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1995) (reversing dismissal of privacy tort in which lawyer sued his law firm employer 
because “information about his male partner was shared ‘with persons who had no responsibility 
for the administration of the benefit programs and no need to know the information’”). 
 307.  See Nancy J. Knauer, The Politics of Eradication and the Future of LGBT Rights, 21 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 617 n.12 (2020) (“Until Bostock, same-sex couples who exercised their 
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put an end to employers punishing gay newlyweds. But a problem 
remains: employers can ask job applicants about their marital status 
during job interviews. Some federal opinions have treated questions 
about marriage status and plans as a per se violation of Title VII when 
followed by an adverse job action.308 The Bostock opinion provides 
another reason to embrace this line of precedent. 
B.  Precluding Penalties for Employees Misrepresenting Their Sexual 
Orientation 
The gay perjury trap is premised on the notion that employees can 
be fired for lying. This section reviews that premise and argues that 
lying about sexual orientation in a post-Bostock work environment 
should not be grounds for firing or other adverse employer actions. 
Even if courts interpret Title VII to forbid inquiries into sexual 
orientation—as they should—and even if employers have a policy of 
not asking, many employers will still ask. Our national experience with 
the military’s failed Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (“DADT”) policy proves 
the point. Although DADT contained an explicit prohibition on 
military officers asking about sexual orientation or investigating 
rumors that a servicemember was gay, officers continued to ask, harass, 
and discharge gay military members.309 Due to this type of rampant 
noncompliance with the policy, it is not sufficient to merely prohibit 
employers’ inquiry into sexual orientation. When illegally asked about 
their sexual orientation, gay servicemembers generally lied to protect 
their jobs.310 Many gay employees in the civilian sector are likely to 
respond similarly.  
 
constitutional right to marry could be fired the next day due to their sexual orientation in a 
majority of states.”); Gene Robinson, State of LGBT Rights: Married on Sunday, but Fired on 
Monday, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 14, 2017, 1:19 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/state-of-lgbt-
rights-married-on-sunday-but-fired-on-monday [https://perma.cc/RAP7-WHS3] (same); see also 
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 166 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (“In its 
amicus submission, the EEOC quite reasonably asks whether it is just that a gay employee can be 
married on Sunday, and fired on Monday—discriminated against at his or her job for exercising 
a right that is protected by the Constitution.”), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. 
Ct. 1731 (2020). 
 308.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2004) 
(“The Eighth Circuit has considered such questions [about marriage status and plans] a per se 
violation of Title VII.”). 
 309.  See NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: HOW THE GAY BAN UNDERMINES THE 
MILITARY AND WEAKENS AMERICA 167–99 (2009). 
 310.  See Kim D. Chanbonpin, “It’s a K kou Thing”: The DADT Repeal and a New 
Vocabulary of Anti-Subordination, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 905, 919 (2013) (“Because LGBTQ 
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Misrepresenting one’s sexual orientation in this context should not 
constitute a fireable offense because, as the Bostock Court recognized, 
Title VII does not “care if other factors besides sex contribute to an 
employer’s discharge decision.”311 Combining sexual orientation and 
lying about sexual orientation does not change the calculus because the 
terminated employee’s sexual orientation “need not be the sole or 
primary cause of the employer’s adverse action.”312 As long as an 
employer treats sexual orientation as a factor, Title VII is violated. 
Although an employer may try to argue that the employee’s 
misrepresentation is the sole ground for termination, courts should be 
wary of such arguments, as the following sections explain. 
1. Lying as a Fireable Offense.  Employers may argue that even if 
their inquiries into sexual orientation are illegal, an employee can still 
be fired for lying. Courts routinely hold that employers may penalize 
employees for having lied during the application process. This is one of 
the lessons from Acanfora: dishonesty provides sufficient cause for 
termination.313 In the past, when fired employees sued claiming 
violations of Title VII on the basis of racial or gender discrimination, 
courts rejected their claims where the employer could show that the 
termination stemmed from the employee’s misrepresentation during 
the application process or a subsequent internal inquiry.  
For example, in Hargett v. New York City Transit Authority,314 a 
terminated employee sued, alleging that he was being discriminated 
 
service members feared separation from service, many of them were forced to lie or mislead their 
colleagues, thereby actually undermining unit cohesion.”); Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 
968, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The policy of the Act is not only inherently deceptive. It also offers 
powerful inducements to homosexuals to lie.”), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Log 
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 907 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting a gay 
servicemember “testified that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Act effectively made it impossible to 
honor the ‘Integrity First’ value of the credo, because on occasion, he felt forced to lie rather than 
violate the Act”), vacated, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled 
Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1141, 1153 (1997) (“The lies that gay and lesbian servicemembers are forced to tell about 
themselves under the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy are, to say the least, a matter of active concern 
for them.”). 
 311.  Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1748 (2020). 
 312.  Id. at 1744. 
 313.  See supra notes 119–148 and accompanying text. 
 314.  Hargett v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 640 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Hargett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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against based on his race.315 The employer, the New York City Transit 
Authority (“NYCTA”), responded that the employee was fired 
because on his employment application, he represented that he had 
never been disciplined by an employer nor resigned while a disciplinary 
action was pending against him.316 This was a lie.317 The employee 
swore, under penalty of prosecution, he had left a previous position 
because of a bank merger.318 This, too, was not true.319 The plaintiff 
argued it was unfair for the NYCTA to investigate him because he had 
already passed a background check and was an employee.320 The court 
rejected this argument, characterizing the plaintiff’s argument as “since 
the NYCTA Defendants failed to [discover] that he lied to them in 
1998, they missed their chance.”321 The court reasoned “there is no such 
rule. It was only good luck—and perhaps shoddy work by the human 
resources department—that NYCTA did not discover that Hargett had 
been twice fired, and was lying on his employment application.”322 
Those lies constituted good cause for his termination, and the district 
judge accordingly granted summary judgment to the employer.323 
Courts have also rejected discrimination claims when employers 
terminate an employee for falsely representing his or her educational 
achievement. For example, in Gilty v. Village of Oak Park,324 Selester 
Gilty applied to be a law enforcement officer in Oak Park, Illinois, and 
represented that he had a bachelor’s degree and was pursuing his 
master’s degree, when in reality he held only a high school diploma.325 
When his employer discovered the lie, it terminated him.326 Gilty sued, 
alleging racial discrimination.327 Although the position did not require 
a bachelor’s degree, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city: 
“[T]he point [was] not that Gilty needed, but did not have, a bachelor’s 
 
 315.  Id. at 455, 471–72.  
 316.  Id. at 462–63. 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  Id. at 462. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Id. at 477. 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  Id. at 477–78. 
 323.  Id. at 477–79, 482.  
 324.  Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 325.  Id. at 1248–49, 1251. 
 326.  Id. at 1249. 
 327.  See id.  
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degree or master’s degree. The point [was] that he lied.”328 Similarly, in 
Williams v. Boorstin,329 the D.C. Circuit rejected a Title VII claim by a 
terminated employee, Joslyn Williams, who alleged racial 
discrimination but who had falsely represented in the application 
process that he had a law degree, a requirement for the position.330 The 
court explained that both the lack of credentials and the lying were 
independent grounds for dismissal: “The lying itself, also from the 
outset, made him an unfit employee of the Library of Congress, wholly 
apart from the question of his not being a lawyer or his serving well in 
assigned tasks.”331  
Many pro-employer decisions stand for the basic proposition that 
“an employer is entitled to expect and to require truthfulness and 
accuracy from its employees.”332 The Seventh Circuit held it “obvious 
that companies must be able to discharge . . . an untruthful 
employee.”333 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “[f]alse statements 
impair the employer’s ability to make sound judgments that may be 
important to the employer’s legal, ethical and economic well-being.”334  
This line of cases does not, however, stand for the proposition that 
any lie justifies termination. To fire an employee for lying on an 
employment application or during a pre-employment inquiry, the 
misrepresentation must have been both material in the decision to hire 
the applicant and directly related to employment duties.335 Officer 
Gilty lied to make himself look more qualified for the job.336 Mr. 
Williams lied to satisfy the minimum qualifications for his job.337 Both 
lies were material. An employer can terminate an employee for 
 
 328.  Id. at 1251. 
 329.  Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 330.  Id. at 110–11. In contrast to Gilty, see supra note 328, the job at issue specifically required 
a law degree, id. at 110. 
 331.  Id. at 118. 
 332.  EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Serrano v. 
Cintas Corp., No. 04-40132, 2008 WL 2512921, at *14 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2008) (“[B]asic honesty 
is an objective qualification for any legitimate position of employment.”). 
 333.  6 W. Ltd. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 778 (7th Cir. 2001).  
 334.  Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d at 1176.  
 335.  Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 336.  See supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
 337.  See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
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misrepresenting educational credentials,338 employment history,339 a 
medical condition relevant to necessary licensing,340 or violation of the 
firm’s fraternization policy.341 Each of these lies relates to the 
applicant’s or employee’s qualifications to hold the position at issue. 
Lies about sexual orientation do not, as the following discussion 
explains. 
2. Why Misrepresenting One’s Sexual Orientation Should Not Be a 
Fireable Offense.  Employees trying to evade the gay perjury trap face 
a burden; when deciding employment discrimination cases, “[c]ourts of 
law are very fond of the truth and favor it on almost every occasion.”342 
Inquiries into sexual orientation, however, represent the exceptional 
occasion in which an employer is not necessarily entitled to the truth. 
Despite precedent suggesting that those who answer improper 
questions dishonestly should not be able to challenge the legality of the 
question,343 Title VII should be interpreted in a manner that protects 
gay employees’ ability to conceal their sexual orientation. Courts 
should hold that Title VII precludes employers from terminating or 
disciplining employees for misrepresenting their sexual orientation. 
This is true for the following four reasons.  
 a. Sexual Orientation as Immaterial.  Those cases in which courts 
held that an employee could be terminated for lying during the 
application process are distinguishable from instances in which a gay 
employee is terminated for lying about their sexual orientation. The 
lies in the former set of cases went to the applicant’s qualifications to 
 
 338.  See, e.g., Robinson v. U.S. Air Force, 635 F. Supp. 108, 110–11 (D.D.C. 1986) (upholding 
termination of employee due to his false claim that he had an M.A. degree on his employment 
application). 
 339.  See, e.g., Grier v. Casey, 643 F. Supp. 298, 309 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (explaining while 
“[i]ntegrity, honesty, and a concerted effort in one’s duties are legitimate qualifications to demand 
of any employer [sic] in any position, whether a corporate President or a postal clerk,” “[t]he 
Plaintiff d[id] not have those qualifications,” as the employee had lied on her job application 
about having been fired from several previous jobs).  
 340.  See, e.g., Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 802–804, 809 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding 
lying about a medical condition relevant to a license needed to do part of a job justifies 
termination).  
 341.  See Gooden v. Ryan’s Rest. Grp., Inc., No. 5:04-CV-179-R, 2007 WL 855326, at *1, *13 
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 14, 2007) (concluding lying about violation of fraternization policy justifies 
termination). 
 342.  EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176 n.6 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 343.  See infra note 349. 
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hold the job in the first place. It would have been perfectly legal for the 
employer to decline to hire the applicant based on the concealed 
information. For example, the employer could tell an applicant that she 
will not be hired because she does not have the necessary education or 
experience. 
In contrast, after Bostock, the employer cannot ask applicants 
about their sexual orientation in order to classify them as qualified or 
unqualified for the job.344 Bostock holds that sexual orientation is not 
relevant to employment decisions.345 Consequently, any 
misrepresentation about sexual orientation is immaterial to a hiring 
decision, and the employer’s purported reason for firing the employee 
could be seen as a pretext for discrimination.  
Under general principles of employment discrimination law, after 
a plaintiff has proven their prima facie case, they can rebut a defense 
that the termination was justified by showing that the employer’s 
asserted reason for taking adverse action is pretextual.346 When a Title 
VII plaintiff shows that the employer’s stated reason for adverse action 
is pretextual, this “can be strong evidence that a defendant has acted 
with discriminatory intent.”347 Firing gay employees for concealing 
their sexual orientation should be treated as a pretext for termination 
based on orientation, not deception.  
An employer who takes adverse action upon learning that a 
supposedly straight worker is gay is most likely motivated by that 
employee’s homosexuality, not by any previous misrepresentations of 
heterosexuality. The alleged deception is a red herring. As seen in 
 
 344.  This was true before Bostock in those states and localities with gay-protective statutes. 
See Schoenbaum, supra note 244, at 103. 
 345.  Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (“An individual’s homosexuality 
or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.”). 
 346.  Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49–50 n.3 (2003) (“[After] the employer . . . 
articulate[s] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action . . . . [t]he plaintiff 
can still prove disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the 
employer’s explanation is pretextual.”); Long v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 188, 200 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[S]hould the defendant carry this burden [of showing a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action], the plaintiff must then have an opportunity 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 
were not true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))). 
 347.  Woodard v. Fanboy, LLC, 298 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002); see Hinson v. Clinch 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 831 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n some Title VII cases ‘it is permissible 
for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s 
explanation.’” (citations omitted)). 
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Buttino, an employer’s invocation of deception is often a pretext for 
implementing a broader anti-gay policy.348 An employee should not be 
penalized for giving an untruthful answer to a question that, as the next 
section explains, should never have been asked. 
 b. The Inquiry as Improper.  Courts should interpret Title VII to 
prevent employers from penalizing gay employees for concealing or 
misrepresenting their sexual orientation because any workplace-
initiated questions about sexual orientation are inherently improper. 
A discriminatory firm’s request for assurances that job applicants are 
heterosexual is inappropriate, and any answers given in response 
should not provide the basis for later retribution. The real question is 
not why employees lie about their sexual orientation, but why 
employers ask. 
Many courts, however, have suggested that even if the question 
posed is illegal, a person does not have a right to lie with impunity. For 
example, in nonemployment contexts, in cases involving questions 
about a person’s Communist affiliations, the Supreme Court has 
rejected the principle that 
a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the 
Government should not have asked. Our legal system provides 
methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions—
lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, 
or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and 
willfully answer with a falsehood.349  
The Acanfora court asserted, in the employment context, “courts have 
sustained discharges of government employees for furnishing false 
information pertaining to their qualifications despite the fact that the 
government’s questions were considered to be an unwarranted 
intrusion into constitutionally protected rights.”350 Even if courts 
 
 348.  See BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 316–17, 326–27. 
 349.  Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969) (upholding a criminal conviction where 
the defendant falsely claimed not to be a Communist to the NLRB). Similarly, in a criminal case 
dealing with a false filing of a non-Communist affidavit, required to satisfy the Taft-Hartley Act, 
the Supreme Court held, “There is no reason for this Court to consider the constitutionality of a 
statute at the behest of petitioners who have been indicted for conspiracy by means of falsehood 
and deceit to circumvent the law which they now seek to challenge. This is the teaching of the 
cases.” Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 866 (1966). 
 350.  Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d at 501–02 (citing Rodriguez v. Seamans, 463 F.2d 837 
(D.C. Cir. 1972)); Williams v. United States, 434 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Nichols, J., 
concurring). 
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interpret Title VII to forbid employer questions about sexual 
orientation, this line of cases would suggest that employees cannot 
answer deceptively and, if they do, termination is permissible.  
Given the historical use of the gay perjury trap, courts should 
interpret Title VII to preclude terminations based on deceptive 
answers to inappropriate inquiries into sexual orientation. In other 
contexts, courts have recognized the bind that job applicants find 
themselves in when asked illegal questions and have sided with the 
applicants in discrimination lawsuits. For example, after the Police 
Commissioner of Boston fired a police officer for “falsely stat[ing] 
certain information about his medical history,” the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court in Kraft v. Police Commissioner351 held that a police 
“commissioner had no authority to discharge [an officer] for giving 
false answers to questions that the commissioner under law had no 
right to ask.”352 The justices explained their reasoning in a subsequent 
opinion: “Any result other than the one reached in Kraft at best would 
have ignored the employer’s unlawful inquiries, and at worst would 
have rewarded the employer for them. In either event, employers in 
the future would have been encouraged to violate the law.”353 A federal 
court interpreting claims brought under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act similarly concluded that “an employer that violates its 
employees’ rights by asking impermissible questions ought not be able 
to base adverse employment decisions on the resulting answers (to 
which it was not entitled in the first place).”354 
These opinions essentially highlight the problem of the gay perjury 
trap. When asked an improper question by a job interviewer—for 
example, “Are you gay?”—the gay applicant can do one of two things: 
Tell the truth, and risk being the victim of illegal—but difficult to 
prove—discrimination, or lie and get the job but face the possibility of 
dismissal for dishonesty. As in the decades before Bostock, many 
prudent LGB individuals in need of work will lie. That lie should not 
be a punishable offense; otherwise the gay perjury trap survives, and, 
as the Kraft court noted, employers will essentially have “been 
encouraged to violate the law”355—in this case, Title VII. 
 
 351.  Kraft v. Police Comm’r, 571 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Mass. 1991). 
 352.  Id. at 382. 
 353.  Lysak v. Seiler Corp., 614 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Mass. 1993). 
 354.  Downs v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130, 140 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 355.  Lysak, 614 N.E.2d at 993. 
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 c. Denial May Not Be a Misrepresentation.  Courts also should not 
permit employers to terminate or penalize employees who previously 
indicated their heterosexuality during the application process, but later 
came out as gay, because the prior representation may not have been 
an actual lie at the time. Understanding one’s own sexual orientation 
is a process for many people. Many employees may not realize they are 
gay or bisexual until some time after they have been hired.356 For 
example, Frank Buttino did not realize he was gay until he was twenty-
six years old, two years after he had become an FBI agent.357 
Statements by those who are unaware of their sexual orientation at the 
relevant time are not lies.  
Some gay people may be deceiving themselves about their sexual 
orientation. Many otherwise healthy gay people are affected by 
internalized homophobia or self-hatred. This is particularly common 
for individuals raised in religious institutions that preach 
condemnation of homosexuality. Many religions proclaim 
homosexuality is a sin. Some continue to decree that gay people are an 
affront to God and should be killed.358 Many individuals infected by 
such teachings feel shame and try to convince themselves they are 
heterosexual. Until a person is ready to accept his true orientation, he 
is clearly not ready to discuss his sexual orientation with a job 
interviewer or a boss. For this reason, the inability to recognize or 
acknowledge one’s sexual orientation should not constitute cause for 
termination in the post-Bostock world.  
 d. Valid Reasons to Misrepresent Sexual Orientation.  Finally, 
employees should not be punished for untruthful answers to questions 
about sexual orientation because some people may realize their sexual 
orientation but not acknowledge it publicly for a variety of valid 
reasons. First, many gay people are closeted to their friends and 
family.359 The decision to conceal one’s sexual orientation may be a 
 
 356.  See LEINEN, supra note 56, at 16 (“All, however, reported that some time passed (on the 
average, ten years) before they actually came to identify this interest as homosexual.”). 
 357.  Cramer, supra note 92; see supra notes 90–117 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Buttino case). 
 358.  Ashley Milosevic, The Tides of Transgressions: An Analysis of Defamation and the 
Rights of the LGBT Community, 82 ALB. L. REV. 323, 336 (2018) (“Certain religions, such as the 
Abrahamic religions, believe homosexuality is a sin, an abomination, or worthy of death.”).  
 359.  LEINEN, supra note 56, at 27 (“One officer who expressed such concerns added that his 
greatest single worry was that someone in the precinct would leak the knowledge of his 
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matter of self-preservation for those gay people who live where others 
are particularly hostile—and sometimes violent—toward gay people. 
For many workers, “the threat of forced disclosure means revealing 
and explaining a facet of life that they have worked very hard to 
conceal for many years.”360 Many gay people feel compelled to conceal 
their sexual orientation in order to ensure that they are not disowned 
by their families, shunned by their friends, and/or excommunicated 
from their churches, mosques, or synagogues. It is not the role of a job 
interviewer to force such people to publicly acknowledge their true 
sexuality and endure animosity from friends, family, and community. 
Second, some employees may consider all aspects of their private 
lives off limits to bosses and coworkers. Many people—regardless of 
their sexual orientation—are private by nature. They have no desire to 
share with an employer details of their lives outside the workplace, 
whether it is the fact they take salsa dancing lessons, collect 
commemorative plates, or live with their same-sex partner. The forced 
disclosure of intimate details of their private lives, especially sexual 
orientation, can be unnecessarily stressful for gay individuals.361 If 
asked about their sexual orientation, these people may reflexively do 
what society has demanded of them since birth—maintain their 
privacy, which creates presumptive heterosexuality.362  
Third, some job applicants may rightly conceal their sexual 
orientation because they believe if they volunteer the information, the 
employer will discriminate against them. Even in the aftermath of 
Bostock, many employers will want to discriminate against employees 
and job applicants perceived to be gay. This may be a function of 
unofficial corporate policy or an individual interviewer’s or 
supervisor’s prejudice, and it provides a powerful incentive for gay 
workers to conceal their sexual orientation.363 In fact, studies report a 
 
homosexuality to an unsuspecting member of his family.”). Indeed, some may be married to a 
member of the opposite sex. These are often the same people who were raised in anti-gay religious 
traditions. 
 360.  Brad S. Weinstein, A Right with No Remedy: Forced Disclosure of Sexual Orientation 
and Public “Outing” Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 824 (2005). 
 361.  Arnault, supra note 257, at 785 (“Forced disclosure of sexual orientation is potentially 
damaging for a homosexual. The reverse is seldom true for a heterosexual.”). 
 362.  See LEINEN, supra note 56, at 57. 
 363.  This is the great dilemma that many job applicants, including law students, face when 
drafting their resumes: to be out or not to be out. A resume can implicitly communicate one’s 
sexual orientation if the applicant has held a leadership position in a gay student organization or 
has worked for a gay rights group. (Of course, many straight people also work for such 
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majority of LGBT employees feel compelled to conceal their LGBT 
identity at work.364 Many gay individuals lead bifurcated lives in which 
they are open with their friends but closeted to their bosses and 
colleagues. These people do not conceal their sexual orientation to pad 
their resumes or make themselves look more qualified than they are; 
they conceal their sexual orientation to avoid invidious discrimination. 
Further, some gay people may perceive the need to lie about their 
sexual orientation at work to avoid discrimination in other aspects of 
their lives, such as their eligibility to adopt children.365 
Fourth, even after a gay person has secured a position with an 
employer, they may decide to conceal their sexual orientation to avoid 
uncomfortable situations, including being the target of ostracism, 
taunting, or even physical violence.366 On-the-job harassment against 
gay employees extends from “‘a seemingly endless stream of 
homosexual jokes and anti-gay slurs’ to . . . vandalism and threats of 
violence directed toward openly gay people on the job.”367  
 
organizations and may incorrectly be labeled as “gay.”) Some students may worry that if they 
include such gay-oriented affiliations on their resumes, prejudiced employers will not interview 
them. (Others may conclude that if the employer is prejudiced, they would rather not work for 
that employer anyway, so nothing is lost by being out on one’s resume.) The omission, however, 
does a disservice to the gay job applicant whose resume does not demonstrate the full set of 
leadership abilities or other skills that the person has developed. Nevertheless, if the job applicant 
decides that it is wiser—especially in a down economy—to omit these experiences, the omission 
should not provide the basis for adverse action should the employer later discover the employee’s 
involvement with such organizations. 
 364.  HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., DEGREES OF EQUALITY: A NATIONAL STUDY 
EXAMINING WORKPLACE CLIMATE FOR LGBT EMPLOYEES 5 (2009), 
https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/DegreesOfEquality_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LNF-
7GY7]. 
 365.  See LESLIE COOPER & PAUL CATES, ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RTS. PROJECT, TOO 
HIGH A PRICE: THE CASE AGAINST RESTRICTING GAY PARENTING 42 (2005); see also Cynthia 
R. Mabry, Opening Another Exit from Child Welfare for Special Needs Children – Why Some Gay 
Men and Lesbians Should Have the Privilege to Adopt Children in Florida, 18 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 269, 285 (2005) (“[S]ome gay and lesbian prospective parents intentionally conceal their 
sexual orientation for fear that their opportunity to adopt a child will be denied.”). See generally 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021) (finding that the city’s refusal to 
contract with a Catholic-affiliated foster agency that discriminated against same-sex couples 
violates the agency’s First Amendment rights). 
 366.  See MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, OUTING YOURSELF: HOW TO COME OUT AS 
LESBIAN OR GAY TO YOUR FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND COWORKERS 137–54 (1995).  
 367.  Gregory B. Lewis, Gay Issues in the Workplace, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 201, 201 (1995) 
(book review). 
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This is a particular risk in police departments.368 In many locations, 
the anti-gay prejudice within police departments is deep-seated.369 This 
compels gay officers to conceal their sexual orientation even when gay-
inclusive antidiscrimination policies are in place.370 Once their 
homosexuality becomes known at work, police officers are treated 
worse by their commanding officers and supervisors.371 For example, 
when his fellow officers in New York’s Nassau County Police 
Department learned he was gay, one officer was subjected to constant 
torment, ranging from being called a child molester and having his 
uniform and equipment hidden to having “[h]is colleagues put rocks in 
the hub caps of his police car so that criminals would hear his noisy 
approach.”372 In some departments, gay police officers feel compelled 
to conceal their sexual orientation at work because their homophobic 
coworkers may not provide back up in life-threatening situations.373 
Gay teachers, too, may still find it necessary to conceal their sexual 
orientation to avoid daily harassment from coworkers, students, and 
parents.374 Tommy Schroeder was driven to quit his job as a school 
teacher after students regularly called him a “faggot” in the hallways, 
made harassing phone calls while chanting “faggot, faggot, faggot” at 
him, and slashed his car tires; this occurred while the students’ parents 
falsely accused him of being a pedophile, and Schroeder’s supervisors 
did nothing to protect him.375 Harassment of gay teachers is sufficiently 
common and cruel that discretion is a matter of self-preservation in 
many regions of the country.  
 
 368.  See LEINEN, supra note 56, at 35 (noting one gay police officer found “the word Beware 
was written on his personal car while it was parked in a police parking lot”). 
 369.  See id. at 8. 
 370.  Id. at 2, 14; see also David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making 
Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1222–
23 (2006) (“Even today, gay and lesbian officers can feel strong pressures to keep their sexual 
orientation hidden, or at least unadvertised. This is particularly true for gay male officers.”). 
 371.  See, e.g., Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, No. 10–2361, 2012 WL 185780, at *2 (D. Minn. 
Jan. 23, 2012). 
 372.  Quinn v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep’t, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 373.  LEINEN, supra note 56, at 55; cf. id. at 49 (quoting a closeted gay police officer as saying, 
“You know cops say real disgusting things like they [gays] should all die or they should be put 
away somewhere or something. That closes the door a little more. That sort of solidifies why I 
shouldn’t come out” (alteration in original)). 
 374.  See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002); Lovell v. 
Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 375.  Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 948–49. 
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Bostock does not change this calculation for gay employees 
working in anti-gay police departments, school districts, or many other 
workplaces. Most gay workers would rather have a stable job than an 
uncertain Title VII lawsuit. As a matter of safety and wellbeing, some 
employees may conceal their sexual orientation during the workday. 
Given these legitimate reasons for applicants and employees to do so, 
and given the illegitimacy of employers’ inquiries about sexual 
orientation, courts should recognize that untruthful answers to 
employers’ questions about sexual orientation are not valid grounds 
for terminating or penalizing employees. This right to prevaricate 
should also extend to omitting references to clubs or organizations that 
would implicitly disclose applicants’ sexual orientation. Otherwise, 
employers could employ the gay perjury trap that ensnared Joseph 
Acanfora.376  
This recommendation should not be interpreted as encouraging 
gay people to stay in the closet. Gay people should come out of the 
closet for their own wellbeing, but not because of employer pressure. 
LGB individuals should be out. It is better for the person, the gay 
community, and society.377 Many gay employees hate having to 
misrepresent their sexual orientation at work and find the subterfuge 
causes stress, anxiety, and depression.378 But, at the same time, it would 
be wrong to overlook the utility of the closet as a temporary or 
situational means of avoiding discrimination. Passing lets the gay 
individual get a foot in the door. The bisexual man, for example, can 
prove himself a valuable employee and disprove the stereotypes and 
fallacies used to deny opportunities to gay people. After all, the 
irrationality of the military’s anti-gay policies was proven by gay 
service members who served valiantly.379 American workplaces should 
never adopt policies of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Instead, they should 
follow a different rule: Don’t Ask, But Employees Are Free to Tell. 
 
 376.  See supra notes 119–148 and accompanying text. Of course, no job applicant should be 
allowed to falsely claim membership in a club or organization to which they do not belong. That 
comes close to professing a credential that one does not possess, which is a legitimate reason for 
termination. See supra notes 325–334 and accompanying text. 
 377.  See Steve W. Cole, Margaret E. Kemeny, Shelley E. Taylor & Barbara R. Visscher, 
Elevated Physical Health Risk Among Gay Men Who Conceal Their Homosexual Identity, 15 
HEALTH PSYCH. 243, 243–51 (1996). 
 378.  Lewis, supra note 367, at 202. 
 379.  See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 897–909 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
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C.  Precluding Penalties for Employees Refusing to Answer Questions 
About Sexual Orientation 
In the pre-Bostock era, some courts held that an employee’s 
refusal to reveal their sexual orientation when asked was grounds for 
termination. Most notably, the courts in Walls380 and Truesdale381 held 
that an employee could be penalized for declining to answer questions 
related to sexual orientation on an employer’s questionnaire. Both 
courts, however, relied on sodomy statutes.382 Now that private sexual 
conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally protected and 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is illegal, the 
legal premise that refusal to answer questions about sexual orientation 
warrants termination has evaporated.383  
Post-Bostock, job applicants and employees should be able to 
decline to answer employers’ inquiries about their sexual orientation. 
The inquiry is improper and should be considered presumptive 
evidence of discrimination under Title VII. Post-Bostock Title VII is 
premised on the fact that sexual orientation is irrelevant to job 
performance.384 By analogy, Title VII would not tolerate a job 
applicant being rejected for declining to tell an employer their 
complete racial background. Even in those circumstances in which an 
employer is allowed to ask,385 the employee cannot be punished for 
refusing to answer. 
In addition to being able to rebuff discussions of her sexual 
orientation, the job applicant should still retain the right to prevaricate. 
The right to refuse to answer, alone, is insufficient. Some courts have 
suggested that the refusal to answer invasive personal questions does 
not give rise to a cause of action for illegal termination because one’s 
privacy is not invaded if one refuses to provide the private 
information.386 Such reasoning fails to appreciate the context in which 
the improper question is asked. Refusing to answer a question—even 
 
 380.  Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 381.  Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 371 S.E.2d 503, 509 (N.C. Ct. App 1988). 
 382.  See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text. 
 383.  See supra notes 269–280 and accompanying text. 
 384.  Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (“An individual’s homosexuality 
or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.”). 
 385.  Generally, an employer should not make such inquiries, but these are permissible for 
EEOC record-keeping purposes and voluntary affirmative action plans. See supra note 245. 
 386.  Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Mass. 1982). 
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an illegal one—can make a job applicant appear evasive and 
combative.387 Any employer who is inclined to ask questions about 
homosexuality would probably interpret the refusal to answer as an 
admission.388 More importantly, it would be exceedingly difficult to 
prove that one would have gotten the job but for the refusal to answer 
the inappropriate question. The closet is both a prison and a shield. For 
all the damage that the closet inflicts, gay individuals should be able to 
strategically deploy the closet to avoid unlawful discrimination.  
CONCLUSION 
Truthfulness is generally considered to be a virtue—but not when 
an honest answer would trigger illegal, but challenging to prove, 
discrimination. Depending on the context, mendacity can have utility. 
In some circumstances, an early deception can expose the false 
premises of anti-gay policies. We know that the FBI’s assertion that 
gay people cannot be outstanding agents was erroneous precisely 
because gay Americans—like Frank Buttino—concealed their sexual 
orientation, evaded the FBI’s anti-gay policy, and became exemplary 
agents.  
Historically, however, major employers have sought to prevent 
gay people from disproving the false underpinnings of anti-gay policies 
by concealing their sexual orientation to get hired and then performing 
exceptionally. In the pre-Bostock era, public and private employers 
exploited the gay perjury trap to fire or penalize gay employees for 
lying about their sexual orientation. Prejudiced employers focused on 
the lie precisely because the gay employees had performed their jobs 
well and could not be fired on the merits.  
The Bostock opinion will not end workplace discrimination 
against gay employees. Many employers, managers, and supervisors 
who harbor anti-gay views will continue to discriminate against gay 
workers in ways big and small. Some may try to resurrect the gay 
perjury trap. Federal authorities must be prepared to blunt these 
efforts. The EEOC has a major role to play. It should pursue 
complaints of employees being penalized for concealing or 
misrepresenting their sexual orientation. Although federal courts are 
 
 387.  Prior to Lawrence, job applicants may have enjoyed a Fifth Amendment right to refuse 
to answer questions about gay conduct because, where such activity was illegal, the admission of 
homosexual conduct would be self-incriminating. But exercising this right would hardly endear 
the applicant to the interviewer. 
 388.  See supra notes 179–195 and accompanying text. 
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the ultimate arbiters of the breadth of Title VII, EEOC decisions can 
protect individual employees who face discrimination and can 
influence judicial interpretations of Title VII.  
Judges, too, should recognize how homophobic employers have 
historically set and utilized the gay perjury trap as a way to discriminate 
against gay job applicants and workers. At no point should employers 
be able to use an employee’s concealment or discretion about their 
sexual orientation as a justification for termination, demotion, or any 
other adverse action. Federal judges should interpret Title VII to 
preclude both inquiries about sexual orientation and penalties for 
concealing one’s gay status. Otherwise, the gay perjury trap will survive 
the Bostock opinion. And gay workers will lack genuine protection 
from invidious discrimination.  
The post-Bostock Title VII cannot succeed if employers can use 
alleged dishonesty about sexual orientation as a means of justifying 
anti-gay discrimination and of avoiding liability. Courts should not fall 
for the distraction. The relevant question is not “Why did the applicant 
lie?”, but “Why did the employer ask?” 
 
